



1  
00:00:08,150 --> 00:00:05,510  
good evening and welcome to our sts-133

2  
00:00:09,830 --> 00:00:08,160  
flight readiness review briefing we are

3  
00:00:12,150 --> 00:00:09,840  
happy to be here this evening and joined

4  
00:00:17,109 --> 00:00:12,160  
by nasa's associate administrator for

5  
00:00:21,269 --> 00:00:18,870  
shuttle launch integration manager mike

6  
00:00:24,230 --> 00:00:21,279  
moses good evening and shuttle launch

7  
00:00:25,830 --> 00:00:24,240  
director mike leinbach good evening

8  
00:00:27,029 --> 00:00:25,840  
we'll begin with opening comments and

9  
00:00:29,269 --> 00:00:27,039  
then we'll be happy to take your

10  
00:00:31,750 --> 00:00:29,279  
questions mr gerstenmaier

11  
00:00:33,910 --> 00:00:31,760  
thanks mike we had a

12  
00:00:35,990 --> 00:00:33,920  
really thorough review today and

13  
00:00:40,709 --> 00:00:36,000

we set the 24th at

14

00:00:42,869 --> 00:00:40,719

4 50 p.m for the launch of discovery

15

00:00:45,910 --> 00:00:42,879

we had a good discussion about how all

16

00:00:48,470 --> 00:00:45,920

that goes with the atv and its docking

17

00:00:50,709 --> 00:00:48,480

and atv is continuing to do very well on

18

00:00:52,470 --> 00:00:50,719

orbit they did a collision of ordinance

19

00:00:54,229 --> 00:00:52,480

maneuver checkout today and that went

20

00:00:56,630 --> 00:00:54,239

extremely well

21

00:00:59,990 --> 00:00:56,640

if things go as planned about six hours

22

00:01:01,990 --> 00:01:00,000

before the the launch atv will dock to

23

00:01:04,070 --> 00:01:02,000

iss and then then we'll go ahead and

24

00:01:05,590 --> 00:01:04,080

then launch the shuttle right after that

25

00:01:07,030 --> 00:01:05,600

we took a look at it from an overall

26  
00:01:08,870 --> 00:01:07,040  
timeline standpoint make sure there were

27  
00:01:10,550 --> 00:01:08,880  
no conflicts with the on-orbit crew make

28  
00:01:12,710 --> 00:01:10,560  
sure we could get all the testing worked

29  
00:01:15,030 --> 00:01:12,720  
out and fit in and all that worked

30  
00:01:16,710 --> 00:01:15,040  
extremely well

31  
00:01:18,469 --> 00:01:16,720  
it's also a pretty interesting time

32  
00:01:20,310 --> 00:01:18,479  
overall with the station lots of

33  
00:01:22,710 --> 00:01:20,320  
activities going on

34  
00:01:24,550 --> 00:01:22,720  
as we were in the fr today the htv was

35  
00:01:26,630 --> 00:01:24,560  
moved from the nader port up to the

36  
00:01:28,070 --> 00:01:26,640  
zenith port that was important that

37  
00:01:29,990 --> 00:01:28,080  
clears the way for the shuttle to come

38  
00:01:32,149 --> 00:01:30,000

up and dock the htv needed to be moved

39

00:01:33,749 --> 00:01:32,159

and that was done the power cable was

40

00:01:35,910 --> 00:01:33,759

also attached and i think the crew

41

00:01:37,270 --> 00:01:35,920

ingress is on monday back into the htv

42

00:01:38,870 --> 00:01:37,280

and they'll be able to to get in there

43

00:01:41,270 --> 00:01:38,880

to do some work

44

00:01:42,630 --> 00:01:41,280

sunday progress on docks so it's a it's

45

00:01:44,389 --> 00:01:42,640

a busy time

46

00:01:45,749 --> 00:01:44,399

uh we also spent a little bit of time in

47

00:01:47,990 --> 00:01:45,759

the flight readiness review and talked

48

00:01:49,030 --> 00:01:48,000

about the potential for a soyuz fly

49

00:01:52,550 --> 00:01:49,040

around

50

00:01:55,429 --> 00:01:52,560

we and take to take some pictures

51  
00:01:56,789 --> 00:01:55,439  
of the station we we didn't approve that

52  
00:01:58,389 --> 00:01:56,799  
today but we'll let the teams go ahead

53  
00:02:00,230 --> 00:01:58,399  
and continue to work at the worker

54  
00:02:01,830 --> 00:02:00,240  
during the on-orbit activities to see if

55  
00:02:04,789 --> 00:02:01,840  
it makes sense the russians will

56  
00:02:06,389 --> 00:02:04,799  
continue to evaluate it if it works out

57  
00:02:08,150 --> 00:02:06,399  
and works right we'll get a decision

58  
00:02:10,309 --> 00:02:08,160  
around flight day six if we want to go

59  
00:02:12,150 --> 00:02:10,319  
do that activity so

60  
00:02:13,589 --> 00:02:12,160  
we went over all the systems we spent

61  
00:02:15,510 --> 00:02:13,599  
quite a bit of time talking about the

62  
00:02:17,670 --> 00:02:15,520  
external tank and the stringers to make

63  
00:02:19,350 --> 00:02:17,680

sure we were comfortable with the the

64

00:02:20,869 --> 00:02:19,360

modifications we've made to the tank

65

00:02:22,790 --> 00:02:20,879

make sure we've got everything in a good

66

00:02:24,309 --> 00:02:22,800

configuration

67

00:02:25,990 --> 00:02:24,319

i can't say enough about the work that

68

00:02:28,390 --> 00:02:26,000

the teams have done they did a

69

00:02:30,710 --> 00:02:28,400

tremendous job down here at the cape

70

00:02:33,110 --> 00:02:30,720

removing the foam installing the radius

71

00:02:35,110 --> 00:02:33,120

blocks making the modifications getting

72

00:02:37,110 --> 00:02:35,120

the orbiter back out at the pad the team

73

00:02:38,390 --> 00:02:37,120

just did a tremendous job and then the

74

00:02:40,470 --> 00:02:38,400

number of hours that were spent in

75

00:02:42,550 --> 00:02:40,480

various test facilities testing all the

76

00:02:44,070 --> 00:02:42,560

configurations of the stringers and the

77

00:02:45,589 --> 00:02:44,080

tank components to make sure they were

78

00:02:47,990 --> 00:02:45,599

really ready and we understood what was

79

00:02:49,910 --> 00:02:48,000

going on is just phenomenal so we had a

80

00:02:52,630 --> 00:02:49,920

very thorough review a very

81

00:02:53,990 --> 00:02:52,640

in-depth discussion on the tanks and and

82

00:02:56,790 --> 00:02:54,000

things are looking pretty good we're

83

00:02:58,630 --> 00:02:56,800

also are working now on et 122 and i

84

00:03:00,949 --> 00:02:58,640

think most of the modifications are are

85

00:03:02,630 --> 00:03:00,959

completed on that tank and we'll start

86

00:03:05,030 --> 00:03:02,640

getting it ready to go support the april

87

00:03:06,869 --> 00:03:05,040

19th launch so again the teams have done

88

00:03:09,589 --> 00:03:06,879

a great job i think we're ready to go

89

00:03:11,589 --> 00:03:09,599

next week and uh and we're ready for the

90

00:03:14,070 --> 00:03:11,599

launch so uh mike

91

00:03:15,350 --> 00:03:14,080

thanks bill so let's see yeah i can't

92

00:03:17,270 --> 00:03:15,360

even begin to

93

00:03:19,589 --> 00:03:17,280

to echo enough what bill said about the

94

00:03:22,070 --> 00:03:19,599

the work of the teams around the country

95

00:03:23,509 --> 00:03:22,080

led by our our external tank

96

00:03:25,270 --> 00:03:23,519

folks with lockheed martin at the

97

00:03:26,630 --> 00:03:25,280

michoud assembly facility just outside

98

00:03:28,309 --> 00:03:26,640

of new orleans and then at the marshall

99

00:03:30,149 --> 00:03:28,319

space flight center in huntsville

100

00:03:31,110 --> 00:03:30,159

alabama

101  
00:03:35,430 --> 00:03:31,120  
the

102  
00:03:36,710 --> 00:03:35,440  
into this is is really truly amazing um

103  
00:03:38,070 --> 00:03:36,720  
and then you couple that it's at the end

104  
00:03:40,309 --> 00:03:38,080  
of the program and we're done building

105  
00:03:41,670 --> 00:03:40,319  
tanks and we've effectively uh almost

106  
00:03:44,229 --> 00:03:41,680  
all but turned out the lights at that

107  
00:03:45,910 --> 00:03:44,239  
math facility uh to have this type of

108  
00:03:47,910 --> 00:03:45,920  
failure come in that requires a whole

109  
00:03:49,990 --> 00:03:47,920  
lot of tests and analysis is a real

110  
00:03:52,229 --> 00:03:50,000  
testament to the to the dedication and

111  
00:03:54,630 --> 00:03:52,239  
loyalty of those folks to to step up and

112  
00:03:56,470 --> 00:03:54,640  
and and really come out and help us uh

113  
00:03:57,990 --> 00:03:56,480

including the the teams that had to come

114

00:04:00,309 --> 00:03:58,000

out here to kennedy to do the mods on

115

00:04:01,750 --> 00:04:00,319

the tank themselves you know we had

116

00:04:04,630 --> 00:04:01,760

folks come out right after the holidays

117

00:04:06,309 --> 00:04:04,640

and and get started on on on the

118

00:04:08,710 --> 00:04:06,319

modifications to the tank

119

00:04:10,070 --> 00:04:08,720

and then again the local ksc team who

120

00:04:11,990 --> 00:04:10,080

had to go through

121

00:04:13,830 --> 00:04:12,000

a whole lot of work we actually we were

122

00:04:15,110 --> 00:04:13,840

looking at it from a work time

123

00:04:16,469 --> 00:04:15,120

issue to make sure we hadn't had too

124

00:04:18,150 --> 00:04:16,479

many people working too long and you go

125

00:04:20,069 --> 00:04:18,160

all the way back to the

126

00:04:21,590 --> 00:04:20,079

november 5th launch attempt where we had

127

00:04:23,350 --> 00:04:21,600

the gup leak

128

00:04:25,189 --> 00:04:23,360

and that's that same mechanical team

129

00:04:26,550 --> 00:04:25,199

down here at kennedy who who works on

130

00:04:28,870 --> 00:04:26,560

the gup as they work on the rest of the

131

00:04:30,469 --> 00:04:28,880

et so not only do we have to tear the

132

00:04:32,629 --> 00:04:30,479

gup apart fix that leak put it back

133

00:04:34,310 --> 00:04:32,639

together but we had to initially we did

134

00:04:35,830 --> 00:04:34,320

repairs on the tank out at the pad and

135

00:04:37,590 --> 00:04:35,840

then decided we wanted to do a tanking

136

00:04:38,790 --> 00:04:37,600

test so we added instrumentation and

137

00:04:40,710 --> 00:04:38,800

then we

138

00:04:42,390 --> 00:04:40,720

recognized we needed to roll back had to

139

00:04:44,070 --> 00:04:42,400

do a modification and then roll back out

140

00:04:46,070 --> 00:04:44,080

and when we got back out there we hooked

141

00:04:47,749 --> 00:04:46,080

the gup all back up again so that team's

142

00:04:49,749 --> 00:04:47,759

been working really hard and have

143

00:04:51,030 --> 00:04:49,759

absolutely done an amazing job i i am

144

00:04:52,790 --> 00:04:51,040

very very proud

145

00:04:54,790 --> 00:04:52,800

of them and and the management team in

146

00:04:56,150 --> 00:04:54,800

on top of that structure to to make sure

147

00:04:57,670 --> 00:04:56,160

that those guys are getting what they

148

00:04:59,670 --> 00:04:57,680

need to get their job done

149

00:05:02,070 --> 00:04:59,680

um really really good job

150

00:05:03,990 --> 00:05:02,080

um we talked a little bit at fr uh you

151  
00:05:05,830 --> 00:05:04,000  
know since we've uh

152  
00:05:07,110 --> 00:05:05,840  
since we were last had our flight

153  
00:05:08,150 --> 00:05:07,120  
readiness review which was at the end of

154  
00:05:10,390 --> 00:05:08,160  
october

155  
00:05:11,909 --> 00:05:10,400  
um a couple of things technically we

156  
00:05:13,909 --> 00:05:11,919  
talked about you know we had a circuit

157  
00:05:15,029 --> 00:05:13,919  
breaker problem that led to a power

158  
00:05:16,550 --> 00:05:15,039  
anomaly and one of the main engine

159  
00:05:17,990 --> 00:05:16,560  
controllers and and we had talked that

160  
00:05:19,270 --> 00:05:18,000  
and we were ready to fly with it as is

161  
00:05:20,790 --> 00:05:19,280  
but since we had the downtime we went

162  
00:05:22,710 --> 00:05:20,800  
ahead and changed out all those circuit

163  
00:05:24,150 --> 00:05:22,720

breakers 18 of them on one of the panels

164

00:05:25,430 --> 00:05:24,160

in the cockpit so we have all new

165

00:05:27,189 --> 00:05:25,440

circuit breakers in that system and

166

00:05:28,950 --> 00:05:27,199

everything's good there a lot of time

167

00:05:30,710 --> 00:05:28,960

and cycle stuff

168

00:05:32,790 --> 00:05:30,720

batteries that needed to be changed out

169

00:05:34,070 --> 00:05:32,800

components that have a clock on them

170

00:05:35,110 --> 00:05:34,080

when they need to be changed we had to

171

00:05:36,390 --> 00:05:35,120

look at each one of them to say does

172

00:05:38,390 --> 00:05:36,400

that really need to be changed right now

173

00:05:39,830 --> 00:05:38,400

or or was that requirement more from a

174

00:05:41,749 --> 00:05:39,840

more frequent use and since we hadn't

175

00:05:43,189 --> 00:05:41,759

launched were okay so we looked across

176  
00:05:44,790 --> 00:05:43,199  
the board at all the systems and and had

177  
00:05:46,230 --> 00:05:44,800  
a a handful of things that needed to be

178  
00:05:47,590 --> 00:05:46,240  
worked on and and the ground ops team

179  
00:05:49,270 --> 00:05:47,600  
here in florida really led that effort

180  
00:05:52,629 --> 00:05:49,280  
and did a a great job of keeping us on

181  
00:05:53,670 --> 00:05:52,639  
top of of that list and uh we kind of

182  
00:05:55,909 --> 00:05:53,680  
talk about it i don't know if you've

183  
00:05:57,430 --> 00:05:55,919  
seen the videos where they uh the the

184  
00:05:59,350 --> 00:05:57,440  
how you pay attention to a problem they

185  
00:06:00,309 --> 00:05:59,360  
show the the team passing a basketball

186  
00:06:01,670 --> 00:06:00,319  
back and forth you're supposed to count

187  
00:06:03,670 --> 00:06:01,680  
the number of times the basketball goes

188  
00:06:04,790 --> 00:06:03,680

around and and meanwhile a bear or

189

00:06:06,309 --> 00:06:04,800

gorilla walks right through the middle

190

00:06:07,270 --> 00:06:06,319

of it and you usually don't notice that

191

00:06:08,870 --> 00:06:07,280

because you're paying attention to the

192

00:06:10,230 --> 00:06:08,880

basketball well the stringers were our

193

00:06:12,390 --> 00:06:10,240

basketball here and everybody was paying

194

00:06:13,670 --> 00:06:12,400

attention to it so the the the rest of

195

00:06:14,790 --> 00:06:13,680

the teams were really trying to focus on

196

00:06:16,390 --> 00:06:14,800

all the rest of the stuff to make sure

197

00:06:17,670 --> 00:06:16,400

we didn't miss anything and we reviewed

198

00:06:19,350 --> 00:06:17,680

that pretty good today in a high

199

00:06:20,870 --> 00:06:19,360

confidence that we were in great shape

200

00:06:22,469 --> 00:06:20,880

on the rest of the vehicle you know we

201  
00:06:23,749 --> 00:06:22,479  
swapped out the crew

202  
00:06:25,510 --> 00:06:23,759  
tim copra

203  
00:06:27,990 --> 00:06:25,520  
got replaced by steve bowen he's going

204  
00:06:29,430 --> 00:06:28,000  
to be doing the evas there's two evas he

205  
00:06:31,590 --> 00:06:29,440  
has completed all the training needed

206  
00:06:32,710 --> 00:06:31,600  
for that he's gotten his nbl runs he's

207  
00:06:35,029 --> 00:06:32,720  
gotten his

208  
00:06:36,070 --> 00:06:35,039  
vr lab runs and all the the desktops

209  
00:06:38,469 --> 00:06:36,080  
that he needs to walk through the

210  
00:06:39,909 --> 00:06:38,479  
procedures there um came right back up

211  
00:06:41,830 --> 00:06:39,919  
to speed no real issues and tim was

212  
00:06:43,029 --> 00:06:41,840  
right there helping him uh learn the

213  
00:06:44,390 --> 00:06:43,039

tasks

214

00:06:46,309 --> 00:06:44,400

so we didn't really change any of the

215

00:06:49,749 --> 00:06:46,319

tasks on the evas the only real change

216

00:06:51,589 --> 00:06:49,759

happened um in the arm ops tim copra was

217

00:06:54,309 --> 00:06:51,599

going to be the backup

218

00:06:55,909 --> 00:06:54,319

arm operator on one of the the elc and

219

00:06:57,670 --> 00:06:55,919

pmm moves and then

220

00:06:59,350 --> 00:06:57,680

he was going to be primed on another so

221

00:07:01,510 --> 00:06:59,360

rather than trying to get steve bowen

222

00:07:03,749 --> 00:07:01,520

trained in arm ops we we switched over

223

00:07:05,510 --> 00:07:03,759

uh now that we have the 25s crew up

224

00:07:08,790 --> 00:07:05,520

there with with paulo naspoli katie

225

00:07:10,629 --> 00:07:08,800

coleman and uh dimitri condrey have um

226

00:07:11,830 --> 00:07:10,639

we're going to give them their tasks so

227

00:07:13,589 --> 00:07:11,840

katie's going to pick up some of those

228

00:07:15,350 --> 00:07:13,599

tasks they've been trained for arm

229

00:07:17,510 --> 00:07:15,360

operations so they'll pick up some of

230

00:07:18,710 --> 00:07:17,520

that all in all the crew was in really

231

00:07:20,950 --> 00:07:18,720

good shape and felt very very

232

00:07:23,270 --> 00:07:20,960

comfortable with this this crew change

233

00:07:25,510 --> 00:07:23,280

um and and so no no issues from uh from

234

00:07:27,029 --> 00:07:25,520

a readiness standpoint there

235

00:07:28,790 --> 00:07:27,039

and again the mission baseline hasn't

236

00:07:30,629 --> 00:07:28,800

changed we're still doing the pmm the

237

00:07:31,670 --> 00:07:30,639

permanent logistics module install you

238

00:07:34,469 --> 00:07:31,680

know that's the

239

00:07:36,309 --> 00:07:34,479

the mplm that we've last flew on sts-131

240

00:07:37,990 --> 00:07:36,319

it's been outfitted for permanent stay

241

00:07:40,950 --> 00:07:38,000

on station we're still going to put the

242

00:07:42,710 --> 00:07:40,960

elc the external cargo platform over uh

243

00:07:44,710 --> 00:07:42,720

that has a spare radiator and some empty

244

00:07:46,710 --> 00:07:44,720

cargo spots on it uh we're gonna do

245

00:07:47,909 --> 00:07:46,720

those two evas clean up a lot of the if

246

00:07:49,270 --> 00:07:47,919

you remember way back when we had that

247

00:07:51,670 --> 00:07:49,280

failed pump module on station there's

248

00:07:53,350 --> 00:07:51,680

still a few tasks waiting for these evas

249

00:07:55,510 --> 00:07:53,360

to come clean up and put that pump

250

00:07:58,710 --> 00:07:55,520

module back where it uh it stays until

251

00:08:00,390 --> 00:07:58,720

it's returned home on on sts-135

252

00:08:01,830 --> 00:08:00,400

that's all staying staying the same the

253

00:08:03,909 --> 00:08:01,840

only real change is what bill mentioned

254

00:08:07,589 --> 00:08:03,919

with the the possibility of doing a

255

00:08:09,270 --> 00:08:07,599

soyuz undock and fly about uh it's it's

256

00:08:10,469 --> 00:08:09,280

kind of akin to a soyuz relocate we're

257

00:08:12,150 --> 00:08:10,479

going to go back out a little further

258

00:08:13,830 --> 00:08:12,160

than that to get a little bit wider

259

00:08:15,110 --> 00:08:13,840

angle shot and again we're going to kind

260

00:08:17,510 --> 00:08:15,120

of work that through our normal approval

261

00:08:18,790 --> 00:08:17,520

process for how mission changes come in

262

00:08:20,790 --> 00:08:18,800

and make sure all the right procedures

263

00:08:22,469 --> 00:08:20,800

and all the right analysis is done uh

264

00:08:24,230 --> 00:08:22,479

and be good to go

265

00:08:25,270 --> 00:08:24,240

on the on the tank stringers we spent

266

00:08:26,469 --> 00:08:25,280

most of them

267

00:08:28,150 --> 00:08:26,479

the latter half of the morning and most

268

00:08:30,150 --> 00:08:28,160

of the afternoon talking about it there

269

00:08:32,870 --> 00:08:30,160

was uh you know i'd characterize it as

270

00:08:34,469 --> 00:08:32,880

as very good discussion and and and

271

00:08:37,029 --> 00:08:34,479

diving into all the details behind the

272

00:08:38,310 --> 00:08:37,039

data not uh not any real descent of

273

00:08:39,990 --> 00:08:38,320

anything you know

274

00:08:42,550 --> 00:08:40,000

this just really came down to two

275

00:08:44,389 --> 00:08:42,560

different aspects there's the um the

276  
00:08:45,750 --> 00:08:44,399  
failure mode and what caused it and how

277  
00:08:47,350 --> 00:08:45,760  
it occurred

278  
00:08:48,949 --> 00:08:47,360  
and and what we're really coming down to

279  
00:08:51,190 --> 00:08:48,959  
root cause or most probable root cause

280  
00:08:53,829 --> 00:08:51,200  
there is it's a stack up of small stuff

281  
00:08:55,590 --> 00:08:53,839  
um we learned that

282  
00:08:57,350 --> 00:08:55,600  
the way this part can be built the

283  
00:08:59,350 --> 00:08:57,360  
assembly stresses that can be put into

284  
00:09:01,350 --> 00:08:59,360  
it can really kind of lock up some

285  
00:09:03,030 --> 00:09:01,360  
stress if you think about it

286  
00:09:04,710 --> 00:09:03,040  
this is a metal stringer that's being

287  
00:09:07,350 --> 00:09:04,720  
riveted to a metal

288  
00:09:09,750 --> 00:09:07,360

skin and it's intentionally bent up over

289

00:09:11,590 --> 00:09:09,760

this angled cord and as it's riveted

290

00:09:13,350 --> 00:09:11,600

down if the angles aren't exactly right

291

00:09:14,790 --> 00:09:13,360

and there's some gaps in there you're

292

00:09:16,150 --> 00:09:14,800

going to kind of squeeze it together a

293

00:09:18,389 --> 00:09:16,160

little harder and that kind of locks

294

00:09:20,870 --> 00:09:18,399

some stress into the part such that when

295

00:09:22,630 --> 00:09:20,880

we go and put a cryo load on it and this

296

00:09:24,870 --> 00:09:22,640

whole thing wants to shrink and that

297

00:09:26,470 --> 00:09:24,880

load goes up you've kind of taken away

298

00:09:28,230 --> 00:09:26,480

or i should say let's think of the other

299

00:09:29,670 --> 00:09:28,240

way you've added some extra load onto

300

00:09:31,110 --> 00:09:29,680

that that wasn't really supposed to be

301

00:09:32,310 --> 00:09:31,120

there in the first place

302

00:09:33,430 --> 00:09:32,320

we thought that was really going to be

303

00:09:35,670 --> 00:09:33,440

our problem right before christmas we

304

00:09:37,670 --> 00:09:35,680

kind of thought we had that root cause

305

00:09:40,389 --> 00:09:37,680

we set up a whole bunch of tests and

306

00:09:41,910 --> 00:09:40,399

making these assembly

307

00:09:43,750 --> 00:09:41,920

glitches

308

00:09:45,190 --> 00:09:43,760

intentionally we couldn't break the

309

00:09:46,790 --> 00:09:45,200

parts we weren't able to break them so

310

00:09:48,630 --> 00:09:46,800

we knew something wasn't quite right

311

00:09:49,590 --> 00:09:48,640

with that and we went back and looked

312

00:09:53,910 --> 00:09:49,600

and

313

00:09:55,990 --> 00:09:53,920

recognized that

314

00:09:57,750 --> 00:09:56,000

that we had some unstable crack growth

315

00:09:59,350 --> 00:09:57,760

due to low fracture toughness in some of

316

00:10:01,110 --> 00:09:59,360

the parts we took off the tank the

317

00:10:03,590 --> 00:10:01,120

failed parts we brought off the tank and

318

00:10:07,509 --> 00:10:03,600

then we started looking at other parts

319

00:10:09,430 --> 00:10:07,519

you know we had this is et138 uh et-139

320

00:10:11,509 --> 00:10:09,440

was in component

321

00:10:13,590 --> 00:10:11,519

fashion ready to be assembled and become

322

00:10:14,870 --> 00:10:13,600

an external tank as you know it with the

323

00:10:16,630 --> 00:10:14,880

oxygen tank the hydrogen tank and the

324

00:10:19,110 --> 00:10:16,640

inner tank bolted together so all the

325

00:10:21,030 --> 00:10:19,120

the inner tank panels were built or at

326

00:10:23,110 --> 00:10:21,040

least uh mostly built for that system so

327

00:10:25,350 --> 00:10:23,120

we had those parts to go look at as well

328

00:10:27,590 --> 00:10:25,360

and we did some testing and found that

329

00:10:29,990 --> 00:10:27,600

back uh probably in about 2000 or 2002

330

00:10:32,389 --> 00:10:30,000

timeframe we had two different

331

00:10:33,590 --> 00:10:32,399

batches of material come in the aluminum

332

00:10:35,590 --> 00:10:33,600

lithium material that's used to make

333

00:10:37,590 --> 00:10:35,600

these stringers that had a heat

334

00:10:39,990 --> 00:10:37,600

treatment that didn't quite get what we

335

00:10:41,750 --> 00:10:40,000

needed to in terms of properties

336

00:10:43,190 --> 00:10:41,760

this is one of those big picture lesson

337

00:10:44,550 --> 00:10:43,200

learned things that we're actually going

338

00:10:47,509 --> 00:10:44,560

to go right down and make sure as an

339

00:10:49,030 --> 00:10:47,519

agency we're going to grow from this

340

00:10:52,230 --> 00:10:49,040

when we designed the super lightweight

341

00:10:53,829 --> 00:10:52,240

tank we recognized that

342

00:10:55,590 --> 00:10:53,839

this is a very aluminum lithium was a

343

00:10:57,110 --> 00:10:55,600

very brutal material in the first place

344

00:10:59,910 --> 00:10:57,120

and so we did a whole lot of math to

345

00:11:01,590 --> 00:10:59,920

show that if we had cracked stringers

346

00:11:03,269 --> 00:11:01,600

structurally that tank would be okay and

347

00:11:05,350 --> 00:11:03,279

when they did that fail-safe analysis

348

00:11:07,269 --> 00:11:05,360

they found that you could have up to

349

00:11:09,430 --> 00:11:07,279

three of them in a row cracked and you

350

00:11:11,350 --> 00:11:09,440

still had no problems with uh with

351

00:11:12,870 --> 00:11:11,360

safety of the tank that was looking at

352

00:11:15,190 --> 00:11:12,880

it from a structural perspective so

353

00:11:17,990 --> 00:11:15,200

because of that we didn't really

354

00:11:18,949 --> 00:11:18,000

put a requirement in the books for uh

355

00:11:20,470 --> 00:11:18,959

crack

356

00:11:22,230 --> 00:11:20,480

problems so we didn't measure fracture

357

00:11:24,230 --> 00:11:22,240

toughness on the metal we weren't really

358

00:11:26,630 --> 00:11:24,240

worried about it we didn't recognize

359

00:11:29,350 --> 00:11:26,640

that a single crack would then lead to

360

00:11:30,710 --> 00:11:29,360

foam could lead to foam uh being pushed

361

00:11:32,069 --> 00:11:30,720

out of place which would then lead it to

362

00:11:34,150 --> 00:11:32,079

it liberating and becoming an integrated

363

00:11:35,829 --> 00:11:34,160

hazard and debris concern so this is one

364

00:11:38,310 --> 00:11:35,839

of those you can trace it all the way

365

00:11:39,910 --> 00:11:38,320

back to we didn't quite

366

00:11:41,509 --> 00:11:39,920

be as smart enough in the integrated

367

00:11:43,430 --> 00:11:41,519

analysis of a change as we should have

368

00:11:45,269 --> 00:11:43,440

been and it's a theme that gets repeated

369

00:11:46,870 --> 00:11:45,279

a lot in in human spaceflight and it's a

370

00:11:48,630 --> 00:11:46,880

reason why we are we try to make as

371

00:11:50,389 --> 00:11:48,640

rigorous as we can

372

00:11:52,790 --> 00:11:50,399

so we had some metal come in we we

373

00:11:54,230 --> 00:11:52,800

measure its ultimate strength and but we

374

00:11:55,670 --> 00:11:54,240

didn't put a maximum on that strength

375

00:11:57,829 --> 00:11:55,680

and these two heat lots we're at the

376  
00:11:59,190 --> 00:11:57,839  
maximum the highest strength material

377  
00:12:01,110 --> 00:11:59,200  
we've ever got you initially think

378  
00:12:03,030 --> 00:12:01,120  
that's a really good thing but that also

379  
00:12:04,389 --> 00:12:03,040  
means that metal is even more brittle

380  
00:12:05,990 --> 00:12:04,399  
the stronger it gets the the more

381  
00:12:07,590 --> 00:12:06,000  
brittle it gets and so

382  
00:12:09,470 --> 00:12:07,600  
it had really low fracture toughness and

383  
00:12:12,069 --> 00:12:09,480  
we found that scattered throughout

384  
00:12:14,710 --> 00:12:12,079  
et-137 which is the the tank we have

385  
00:12:16,870 --> 00:12:14,720  
right now and even going back to et-136

386  
00:12:20,069 --> 00:12:16,880  
and then a couple of stringers on tanks

387  
00:12:22,550 --> 00:12:20,079  
as far back as et-131 had this bad metal

388  
00:12:24,470 --> 00:12:22,560

on it this low fracture toughness metal

389

00:12:26,550 --> 00:12:24,480

but we know low fracture toughness alone

390

00:12:28,629 --> 00:12:26,560

isn't enough to cause cracks because

391

00:12:30,629 --> 00:12:28,639

after we tanked this tank not every

392

00:12:31,829 --> 00:12:30,639

single stringer i forget the numbers

393

00:12:34,870 --> 00:12:31,839

there's probably

394

00:12:36,790 --> 00:12:34,880

close to 70 of them 77 of them

395

00:12:38,550 --> 00:12:36,800

that are this suspect metal we only had

396

00:12:40,069 --> 00:12:38,560

five cracks so we know fracture

397

00:12:41,990 --> 00:12:40,079

toughness alone also isn't the problem

398

00:12:44,069 --> 00:12:42,000

so you have assembly stress that that

399

00:12:45,509 --> 00:12:44,079

kind of adds residual uh stress into the

400

00:12:47,269 --> 00:12:45,519

parts and then you have fracture

401  
00:12:49,430 --> 00:12:47,279  
toughness which lowers the capability of

402  
00:12:51,190 --> 00:12:49,440  
that part when those two lines cross you

403  
00:12:52,710 --> 00:12:51,200  
you crack a stringer

404  
00:12:54,790 --> 00:12:52,720  
and so that's that's what happened to us

405  
00:12:56,230 --> 00:12:54,800  
so this mod we put on really is just

406  
00:12:57,910 --> 00:12:56,240  
kind of if you want to think of it's a

407  
00:12:59,990 --> 00:12:57,920  
big metal band-aid and big is not the

408  
00:13:01,430 --> 00:13:00,000  
right word it's about six inches long

409  
00:13:02,550 --> 00:13:01,440  
we kind of added it on top of these

410  
00:13:04,790 --> 00:13:02,560  
rivets

411  
00:13:06,230 --> 00:13:04,800  
so that the the stress is taken up and

412  
00:13:08,389 --> 00:13:06,240  
given some extra reinforcement in that

413  
00:13:10,870 --> 00:13:08,399

location and and we don't have that

414

00:13:13,829 --> 00:13:10,880

problem when we hit that cryo loading uh

415

00:13:15,829 --> 00:13:13,839

shock on the oxidizer the lo2 flange

416

00:13:17,350 --> 00:13:15,839

which is at the top of the inner tank we

417

00:13:19,430 --> 00:13:17,360

talked a lot about the hydrogen flange

418

00:13:21,670 --> 00:13:19,440

and why doesn't that flange also exhibit

419

00:13:23,590 --> 00:13:21,680

the same type as it bends in why isn't

420

00:13:25,350 --> 00:13:23,600

it cracking none of our x-rays today

421

00:13:27,350 --> 00:13:25,360

have shown any cracks on that side and

422

00:13:29,269 --> 00:13:27,360

what we we learned was this assembly

423

00:13:31,509 --> 00:13:29,279

stress that happens on the

424

00:13:33,430 --> 00:13:31,519

the lo2 side at the top of the stringer

425

00:13:35,430 --> 00:13:33,440

when we lay this part up you start at

426

00:13:37,110 --> 00:13:35,440

the bottom which is the hydrogen side

427

00:13:38,710 --> 00:13:37,120

and then you rivet from there up and so

428

00:13:41,030 --> 00:13:38,720

any kind of misalignment any kind of

429

00:13:42,790 --> 00:13:41,040

extra length any kind of shims that

430

00:13:44,470 --> 00:13:42,800

aren't quite right propagate themselves

431

00:13:46,310 --> 00:13:44,480

and manifest at the end of the stringer

432

00:13:48,230 --> 00:13:46,320

on the oxide but they're locked in and

433

00:13:49,829 --> 00:13:48,240

controlled pretty well on the hydrogen

434

00:13:51,750 --> 00:13:49,839

side so we're not seeing the assembly

435

00:13:53,110 --> 00:13:51,760

stresses on the hydrogen side even

436

00:13:54,870 --> 00:13:53,120

though those material properties are

437

00:13:56,790 --> 00:13:54,880

lower there's just not enough stress in

438

00:13:59,189 --> 00:13:56,800

the system to make it break

439

00:14:01,590 --> 00:13:59,199

so that that said we spent a lot of time

440

00:14:03,430 --> 00:14:01,600

being rigorous as we needed to be to go

441

00:14:05,509 --> 00:14:03,440

do the analysis and the tests to make

442

00:14:08,069 --> 00:14:05,519

sure that all that theory held up

443

00:14:10,150 --> 00:14:08,079

that even with the worst case

444

00:14:11,590 --> 00:14:10,160

dispersions that we truly understood the

445

00:14:13,509 --> 00:14:11,600

system and that that hydrogen flange

446

00:14:15,189 --> 00:14:13,519

wouldn't break because we did not modify

447

00:14:16,949 --> 00:14:15,199

it and that the modification we put on

448

00:14:18,710 --> 00:14:16,959

the top of the tank on the lo2 side

449

00:14:20,389 --> 00:14:18,720

wasn't going to do any harm

450

00:14:21,509 --> 00:14:20,399

and and all those results came back it

451  
00:14:23,590 --> 00:14:21,519  
took us a while to get through all the

452  
00:14:25,590 --> 00:14:23,600  
data today and again we kind of talked

453  
00:14:30,150 --> 00:14:25,600  
about the actual number was the factor

454  
00:14:31,670 --> 00:14:30,160  
of safety 1.5 or 1.4 or 1.42 at the end

455  
00:14:33,910 --> 00:14:31,680  
of the day we recognize that the the

456  
00:14:35,910 --> 00:14:33,920  
ability to nail that number down exactly

457  
00:14:37,430 --> 00:14:35,920  
is just not going to happen there's a

458  
00:14:39,670 --> 00:14:37,440  
lot of variables here and we kind of

459  
00:14:41,990 --> 00:14:39,680  
bounded it by

460  
00:14:43,590 --> 00:14:42,000  
a risk assessment to say what are the

461  
00:14:45,750 --> 00:14:43,600  
likely failure modes what are the likely

462  
00:14:47,509 --> 00:14:45,760  
causes and and we really kind of got

463  
00:14:49,030 --> 00:14:47,519

very good agreement from the community

464

00:14:51,030 --> 00:14:49,040

and then in our independent teams who

465

00:14:52,310 --> 00:14:51,040

were looking over our shoulder that we

466

00:14:54,150 --> 00:14:52,320

had a rigorous approach and they were

467

00:14:55,910 --> 00:14:54,160

happy with our analysis and we ended up

468

00:14:57,590 --> 00:14:55,920

with a unanimous goal to be ready to fly

469

00:14:58,710 --> 00:14:57,600

this tank now we're going to keep doing

470

00:15:00,430 --> 00:14:58,720

the math we're going to keep working

471

00:15:04,150 --> 00:15:00,440

we're going to keep testing

472

00:15:06,470 --> 00:15:04,160

et-122 is the next one up on sts-134

473

00:15:07,990 --> 00:15:06,480

that tank was built way before

474

00:15:08,710 --> 00:15:08,000

this tank

475

00:15:10,150 --> 00:15:08,720

but

476  
00:15:11,269 --> 00:15:10,160  
so we know it didn't have metal coming

477  
00:15:12,870 --> 00:15:11,279  
from that heat lot but the one thing

478  
00:15:14,550 --> 00:15:12,880  
we're missing there is

479  
00:15:16,150 --> 00:15:14,560  
metal sitting on the shelf at the at the

480  
00:15:18,389 --> 00:15:16,160  
plant that we can then go test and make

481  
00:15:19,430 --> 00:15:18,399  
sure that it really isn't a bad fracture

482  
00:15:21,430 --> 00:15:19,440  
toughness because like i said at the

483  
00:15:24,069 --> 00:15:21,440  
beginning we weren't ever measuring

484  
00:15:26,389 --> 00:15:24,079  
fracture toughness we don't think it is

485  
00:15:27,590 --> 00:15:26,399  
bad metal but we can't prove it in the

486  
00:15:28,870 --> 00:15:27,600  
in the time that we've been going on

487  
00:15:30,069 --> 00:15:28,880  
here that the teams think they have a

488  
00:15:31,910 --> 00:15:30,079

good link and will be able to show us

489

00:15:34,230 --> 00:15:31,920

that that metal is truly good metal and

490

00:15:35,350 --> 00:15:34,240

and this is not a problem for et-122 but

491

00:15:37,350 --> 00:15:35,360

we want to kind of back that up with

492

00:15:38,710 --> 00:15:37,360

some testing and uh and now that we get

493

00:15:40,550 --> 00:15:38,720

this flight behind us we'll go do that

494

00:15:42,230 --> 00:15:40,560

before we fly the next tank but we went

495

00:15:43,189 --> 00:15:42,240

ahead and added the modification to that

496

00:15:45,430 --> 00:15:43,199

tank

497

00:15:47,990 --> 00:15:45,440

just as a stop gap to say let's be safe

498

00:15:50,389 --> 00:15:48,000

we know that fixes the the the ox flange

499

00:15:53,509 --> 00:15:50,399

et-138 is our last tank flying on

500

00:15:55,269 --> 00:15:53,519

sts-135 it's a sister tank to et-137

501  
00:15:57,269 --> 00:15:55,279  
sent out the pad right now it will need

502  
00:15:58,230 --> 00:15:57,279  
the modification on the the ox flange

503  
00:16:00,069 --> 00:15:58,240  
and we're going to keep doing all the

504  
00:16:01,350 --> 00:16:00,079  
math to make sure we understand truly

505  
00:16:02,389 --> 00:16:01,360  
what's going on

506  
00:16:05,430 --> 00:16:02,399  
and see if we need to be a little

507  
00:16:06,870 --> 00:16:05,440  
smarter or we can we can understand the

508  
00:16:09,189 --> 00:16:06,880  
the actual risk we're flying with on

509  
00:16:11,990 --> 00:16:09,199  
that tank but at the end of the day a

510  
00:16:13,430 --> 00:16:12,000  
really good summary of where we stand

511  
00:16:16,150 --> 00:16:13,440  
we feel we have very high confidence

512  
00:16:17,670 --> 00:16:16,160  
when you when you boil it down the uh we

513  
00:16:19,430 --> 00:16:17,680

looked at what what's going to happen if

514

00:16:21,189 --> 00:16:19,440

we're wrong and we do get a crack

515

00:16:22,949 --> 00:16:21,199

the arrow loads on this thing on the

516

00:16:24,629 --> 00:16:22,959

hydrogen side or such that most of those

517

00:16:25,910 --> 00:16:24,639

stringers are being pushed down by the

518

00:16:27,990 --> 00:16:25,920

arrow loads so you're not worried about

519

00:16:29,590 --> 00:16:28,000

foam liberation and the size of foam

520

00:16:31,509 --> 00:16:29,600

that would come off would be kind of

521

00:16:33,749 --> 00:16:31,519

bounded by what potentially could be

522

00:16:35,910 --> 00:16:33,759

lost there from other mechanisms of foam

523

00:16:38,949 --> 00:16:35,920

loss that's not saying that a foam loss

524

00:16:40,389 --> 00:16:38,959

from a cracked hydrogen stringer is okay

525

00:16:42,389 --> 00:16:40,399

but we feel that the risk there is

526

00:16:44,230 --> 00:16:42,399

acceptable to us and it's it's in that

527

00:16:45,910 --> 00:16:44,240

accepted risk category we understand it

528

00:16:48,069 --> 00:16:45,920

we know the likelihood of it and it's

529

00:16:48,949 --> 00:16:48,079

very low so we're good to fly

530

00:16:50,870 --> 00:16:48,959

um

531

00:16:53,910 --> 00:16:50,880

let's see what else uh the the big piece

532

00:16:55,269 --> 00:16:53,920

of that is kind of we showed that uh if

533

00:16:56,710 --> 00:16:55,279

if we're gonna get cracks we're gonna be

534

00:16:57,910 --> 00:16:56,720

able to see them during tanking um

535

00:16:59,749 --> 00:16:57,920

there's plenty of time for the final

536

00:17:02,150 --> 00:16:59,759

inspection team to notice those the

537

00:17:03,990 --> 00:17:02,160

camera crews that uh or that we have otv

538

00:17:05,510 --> 00:17:04,000

cameras that are scanning the tank we'll

539

00:17:07,110 --> 00:17:05,520

see this right away long before we lift

540

00:17:08,470 --> 00:17:07,120

off and if we do see

541

00:17:09,990 --> 00:17:08,480

a crack on those flanges we would

542

00:17:12,230 --> 00:17:10,000

obviously be no go for that for that day

543

00:17:13,829 --> 00:17:12,240

and and we're not worried about lifting

544

00:17:15,590 --> 00:17:13,839

off we just wanted to make sure that

545

00:17:16,870 --> 00:17:15,600

during ascent that load couldn't

546

00:17:18,470 --> 00:17:16,880

couldn't cause a crack or cause one to

547

00:17:20,230 --> 00:17:18,480

propagate and grow big enough

548

00:17:21,829 --> 00:17:20,240

to cause foam and we showed that that

549

00:17:23,669 --> 00:17:21,839

was fairly well bounded as well and and

550

00:17:25,590 --> 00:17:23,679

not not a big risk to us

551

00:17:26,870 --> 00:17:25,600

um so there's a a kind of a brief

552

00:17:28,230 --> 00:17:26,880

summary of what's been about three

553

00:17:29,590 --> 00:17:28,240

months worth of work

554

00:17:32,070 --> 00:17:29,600

um and really you've kind of heard

555

00:17:34,470 --> 00:17:32,080

interim reports from from john shannon

556

00:17:36,390 --> 00:17:34,480

as we've gone along that that we still

557

00:17:37,750 --> 00:17:36,400

kept learning every single day and we've

558

00:17:39,270 --> 00:17:37,760

just really turned the corner here in

559

00:17:40,870 --> 00:17:39,280

the last month where we think we finally

560

00:17:42,950 --> 00:17:40,880

bounded the problem we pulled it all

561

00:17:45,029 --> 00:17:42,960

together today and showed that to the to

562

00:17:46,150 --> 00:17:45,039

the agency and again got that unanimous

563

00:17:48,150 --> 00:17:46,160

consent that we're in a really good

564

00:17:50,630 --> 00:17:48,160

posture to fly so with that we're ready

565

00:17:52,150 --> 00:17:50,640

to move to the mission phase um turn it

566

00:17:54,070 --> 00:17:52,160

over to mike and his team to get us

567

00:17:56,150 --> 00:17:54,080

launched in orbit and we talked a little

568

00:17:58,230 --> 00:17:56,160

bit about the range and and you know you

569

00:17:59,909 --> 00:17:58,240

guys saw that we had that uh there's no

570

00:18:01,510 --> 00:17:59,919

way we're gonna launch on the 24th if

571

00:18:03,029 --> 00:18:01,520

atv doesn't launch on their first

572

00:18:04,710 --> 00:18:03,039

attempt and then they didn't and we're

573

00:18:05,830 --> 00:18:04,720

ready to go on the 24th

574

00:18:07,430 --> 00:18:05,840

and i've decided i'm not going to tell

575

00:18:09,110 --> 00:18:07,440

you guys about launch windows ever again

576

00:18:10,150 --> 00:18:09,120

because no matter what i'll somehow lie

577

00:18:11,909 --> 00:18:10,160

to you

578

00:18:13,750 --> 00:18:11,919

but what happened is just like just like

579

00:18:14,950 --> 00:18:13,760

what happens every time

580

00:18:16,230 --> 00:18:14,960

there's a lot of math that has to go

581

00:18:17,590 --> 00:18:16,240

into finding out whether it's a legal

582

00:18:19,510 --> 00:18:17,600

launch window or not so you kind of take

583

00:18:20,789 --> 00:18:19,520

the first cut through and when you get

584

00:18:22,230 --> 00:18:20,799

pushed into saying hey i need a little

585

00:18:23,830 --> 00:18:22,240

better answer you go sharpen your pencil

586

00:18:25,750 --> 00:18:23,840

and you look at it so we looked at the

587

00:18:28,230 --> 00:18:25,760

loads and the analysis the thermal

588

00:18:30,230 --> 00:18:28,240

effects and the power profiles and found

589

00:18:32,230 --> 00:18:30,240

that uh you know the generic round rule

590

00:18:34,549 --> 00:18:32,240

that said you want 24 hours spacing

591

00:18:36,950 --> 00:18:34,559

between the docking and the uh and the

592

00:18:38,470 --> 00:18:36,960

launch of a vehicle to know uh it's okay

593

00:18:41,029 --> 00:18:38,480

we decided here we're gonna be okay so

594

00:18:42,470 --> 00:18:41,039

the atv is gonna dock about six hours

595

00:18:44,470 --> 00:18:42,480

before we launch

596

00:18:46,470 --> 00:18:44,480

we will have tanked the vehicle if they

597

00:18:48,549 --> 00:18:46,480

run into a problem in docking

598

00:18:50,310 --> 00:18:48,559

we will talk about that in real time if

599

00:18:51,909 --> 00:18:50,320

it's a problem that looks like they can

600

00:18:54,150 --> 00:18:51,919

resolve and come back and fix in a few

601  
00:18:55,430 --> 00:18:54,160  
days we'll stand down and scrub off for

602  
00:18:56,390 --> 00:18:55,440  
the day to let them have that chance to

603  
00:18:57,590 --> 00:18:56,400  
get docked

604  
00:18:59,990 --> 00:18:57,600  
the station program really would like

605  
00:19:01,270 --> 00:19:00,000  
the atv present for this mission if it

606  
00:19:02,310 --> 00:19:01,280  
looks like it's a little bigger problem

607  
00:19:04,390 --> 00:19:02,320  
or something that needs a little more

608  
00:19:05,669 --> 00:19:04,400  
time to solve we'll let the atv move out

609  
00:19:07,430 --> 00:19:05,679  
to a parking orbit and we'll go ahead

610  
00:19:08,710 --> 00:19:07,440  
and launch the shuttle on time

611  
00:19:10,070 --> 00:19:08,720  
we've talked about the mechanisms we're

612  
00:19:11,909 --> 00:19:10,080  
going to do and that's that's all ready

613  
00:19:13,909 --> 00:19:11,919

to pull the trigger on so

614

00:19:15,830 --> 00:19:13,919

we're not going to talk about uh

615

00:19:17,510 --> 00:19:15,840

whether what it means if atv can't dock

616

00:19:18,789 --> 00:19:17,520

we still might launch that day we might

617

00:19:19,830 --> 00:19:18,799

not we'll have to talk about that one in

618

00:19:21,990 --> 00:19:19,840

real time

619

00:19:23,830 --> 00:19:22,000

um and uh and that's really all i had so

620

00:19:25,510 --> 00:19:23,840

mike you kind of like i said we want to

621

00:19:27,270 --> 00:19:25,520

focus now on flying

622

00:19:28,950 --> 00:19:27,280

rather than the analysis so that might

623

00:19:30,950 --> 00:19:28,960

lead us into that discussion okay thanks

624

00:19:32,390 --> 00:19:30,960

mike well from a processing perspective

625

00:19:33,590 --> 00:19:32,400

we're in outstanding shape out the

626  
00:19:35,350 --> 00:19:33,600

launch pad

627  
00:19:36,549 --> 00:19:35,360

we're expecting to perform the final

628  
00:19:38,310 --> 00:19:36,559

close out of the aft compartment the

629  
00:19:40,789 --> 00:19:38,320

orbiter tomorrow we got all that work

630  
00:19:42,630 --> 00:19:40,799

done today and powered down the ship now

631  
00:19:44,150 --> 00:19:42,640

so we're able to give the team a full

632  
00:19:45,590 --> 00:19:44,160

two days off

633  
00:19:46,710 --> 00:19:45,600

we will come in sunday afternoon and

634  
00:19:49,350 --> 00:19:46,720

pressurize

635  
00:19:51,909 --> 00:19:49,360

the copvs our high pressure gas bottles

636  
00:19:54,630 --> 00:19:51,919

on the ship that's a hazardous task that

637  
00:19:56,070 --> 00:19:54,640

we do late in the pad flow so we expose

638  
00:19:58,390 --> 00:19:56,080

a minimum amount of people to that

639

00:19:59,830 --> 00:19:58,400

hazard and then that should go fine

640

00:20:01,990 --> 00:19:59,840

sunday afternoon sunday evening and

641

00:20:05,190 --> 00:20:02,000

monday afternoon at uh at three o'clock

642

00:20:07,270 --> 00:20:05,200

we'll pick up the countdown for sts-133

643

00:20:09,750 --> 00:20:07,280

meanwhile over in the opf endeavour is

644

00:20:11,669 --> 00:20:09,760

doing extremely well uh her her opf flow

645

00:20:13,350 --> 00:20:11,679

is essentially over she's up on the

646

00:20:14,950 --> 00:20:13,360

orbit of transporter system ready to

647

00:20:16,549 --> 00:20:14,960

roll over to the vab

648

00:20:18,710 --> 00:20:16,559

which will occur on the 28th of this

649

00:20:19,750 --> 00:20:18,720

month and then out to the pad on the

650

00:20:22,230 --> 00:20:19,760

10th of

651  
00:20:23,669 --> 00:20:22,240  
march for the for the april 19th launch

652  
00:20:24,870 --> 00:20:23,679  
so everything's going extremely well in

653  
00:20:26,230 --> 00:20:24,880  
endeavor too

654  
00:20:28,870 --> 00:20:26,240  
just like to take the opportunity to

655  
00:20:30,630 --> 00:20:28,880  
thank the the 103 team both locally and

656  
00:20:32,710 --> 00:20:30,640  
around the country who who

657  
00:20:35,029 --> 00:20:32,720  
as mike said paid attention to not just

658  
00:20:36,710 --> 00:20:35,039  
the the the 800 pound gorilla but to

659  
00:20:39,029 --> 00:20:36,720  
everything else in the in the processing

660  
00:20:41,029 --> 00:20:39,039  
flow that has to go exactly right

661  
00:20:43,110 --> 00:20:41,039  
we met every day as we always do during

662  
00:20:44,390 --> 00:20:43,120  
an integrated flow laid out all the

663  
00:20:46,710 --> 00:20:44,400

additional tasks that we wanted to

664

00:20:49,990 --> 00:20:46,720

perform and uh the team just responded

665

00:20:51,750 --> 00:20:50,000

an extremely great fashion

666

00:20:53,110 --> 00:20:51,760

that all with all the descript all the

667

00:20:54,789 --> 00:20:53,120

distractions that are going on in the

668

00:20:56,950 --> 00:20:54,799

program right now i'm very very proud of

669

00:20:58,230 --> 00:20:56,960

the 103 team so everything's going

670

00:20:59,750 --> 00:20:58,240

really really well looking forward to

671

00:21:02,549 --> 00:20:59,760

the countdown starting monday and a lift

672

00:21:03,750 --> 00:21:02,559

off next thursday thanks all right mike

673

00:21:05,350 --> 00:21:03,760

thank you

674

00:21:07,190 --> 00:21:05,360

we'll take questions first here in

675

00:21:08,950 --> 00:21:07,200

florida

676  
00:21:10,549 --> 00:21:08,960  
bill harwood

677  
00:21:12,070 --> 00:21:10,559  
well thanks i've got a couple of

678  
00:21:13,750 --> 00:21:12,080  
questions if i could bill hard with cbs

679  
00:21:15,669 --> 00:21:13,760  
news

680  
00:21:17,270 --> 00:21:15,679  
for mike moses i guess

681  
00:21:18,630 --> 00:21:17,280  
realizing you don't have an exact factor

682  
00:21:20,549 --> 00:21:18,640  
of safety i mean obviously it's greater

683  
00:21:22,310 --> 00:21:20,559  
than one i'm assuming and can you talk

684  
00:21:23,350 --> 00:21:22,320  
about where the relative risk lies for

685  
00:21:24,630 --> 00:21:23,360  
cracks it's

686  
00:21:26,390 --> 00:21:24,640  
i'm it's my understanding it's from the

687  
00:21:27,830 --> 00:21:26,400  
thermal shock of fueling

688  
00:21:29,750 --> 00:21:27,840

that you have a better chance of making

689

00:21:30,470 --> 00:21:29,760

something happen than ascent loads could

690

00:21:32,310 --> 00:21:30,480

you

691

00:21:34,549 --> 00:21:32,320

explain the difference in that and the

692

00:21:36,630 --> 00:21:34,559

second question i had was

693

00:21:38,310 --> 00:21:36,640

was about docking the day the atv i mean

694

00:21:39,590 --> 00:21:38,320

launching the day atv gets there

695

00:21:41,270 --> 00:21:39,600

obviously you're putting a cycle on the

696

00:21:43,270 --> 00:21:41,280

tank and you're assuming that they're

697

00:21:45,510 --> 00:21:43,280

gonna i mean i'm assuming that the risk

698

00:21:47,190 --> 00:21:45,520

of putting another cycle on this tank is

699

00:21:49,430 --> 00:21:47,200

outweighed by the need to get off on the

700

00:21:50,710 --> 00:21:49,440

24th i'm not sure i understand why it

701  
00:21:52,390 --> 00:21:50,720  
would make a difference if you just went

702  
00:21:53,510 --> 00:21:52,400  
on the 25th and let those guys get out

703  
00:21:54,789 --> 00:21:53,520  
of the way so

704  
00:21:55,909 --> 00:21:54,799  
okay well let me handle the second one

705  
00:21:57,990 --> 00:21:55,919  
first um

706  
00:21:59,510 --> 00:21:58,000  
uh so back when we we originally uh

707  
00:22:02,870 --> 00:21:59,520  
partnered these agreements with the issa

708  
00:22:04,070 --> 00:22:02,880  
folks and atv um at the time uh we still

709  
00:22:05,270 --> 00:22:04,080  
weren't sure exactly what was happening

710  
00:22:07,110 --> 00:22:05,280  
on the range schedule down here in

711  
00:22:09,190 --> 00:22:07,120  
florida as to what our actual uh

712  
00:22:10,710 --> 00:22:09,200  
capability but you know we have from uh

713  
00:22:12,950 --> 00:22:10,720

from a station shuttle program

714

00:22:14,870 --> 00:22:12,960

constraints standpoint our launch window

715

00:22:16,230 --> 00:22:14,880

is from the 24th to about the 6th of

716

00:22:17,590 --> 00:22:16,240

march

717

00:22:18,950 --> 00:22:17,600

when we sat down and looked at the range

718

00:22:20,950 --> 00:22:18,960

schedules there's a there's an atlas

719

00:22:23,110 --> 00:22:20,960

launch and then a delta launch also in

720

00:22:24,630 --> 00:22:23,120

that same two-week period

721

00:22:27,190 --> 00:22:24,640

and our landing was going to conflict

722

00:22:29,909 --> 00:22:27,200

with the delta launch and so we got

723

00:22:31,110 --> 00:22:29,919

approved for 24 25 and 26 on the range

724

00:22:32,470 --> 00:22:31,120

but we wouldn't have a whole lot more

725

00:22:34,470 --> 00:22:32,480

room than that before we run right into

726

00:22:35,590 --> 00:22:34,480

their launch with our landing so when it

727

00:22:37,110 --> 00:22:35,600

looked like we only really had a

728

00:22:38,950 --> 00:22:37,120

three-day window to launch now we wanted

729

00:22:40,950 --> 00:22:38,960

to go back and say hey you know we gave

730

00:22:42,710 --> 00:22:40,960

atv four days to try but we only have

731

00:22:44,549 --> 00:22:42,720

three for shuttle this isn't working out

732

00:22:45,990 --> 00:22:44,559

so well let's see where we can where we

733

00:22:48,149 --> 00:22:46,000

can push and squeeze so we are getting

734

00:22:49,590 --> 00:22:48,159

squeezed a little bit um i would say

735

00:22:51,510 --> 00:22:49,600

that doesn't mean we're

736

00:22:54,149 --> 00:22:51,520

we're pressured to launch in the 24 25

737

00:22:55,750 --> 00:22:54,159

26 time frame after the atlas goes we

738

00:22:56,870 --> 00:22:55,760

can come back in on

739

00:22:59,110 --> 00:22:56,880

on

740

00:23:00,870 --> 00:22:59,120

march 6th and again just like i kind of

741

00:23:03,029 --> 00:23:00,880

alluded to we said march 6 was the cut

742

00:23:04,789 --> 00:23:03,039

off but that cutoff was because 24s was

743

00:23:06,310 --> 00:23:04,799

going to undock the soyuz was going to

744

00:23:07,909 --> 00:23:06,320

undock we're doing all the work right

745

00:23:09,590 --> 00:23:07,919

now to let them undock to do this fly

746

00:23:12,070 --> 00:23:09,600

around that work will allow us to let

747

00:23:13,669 --> 00:23:12,080

them undock and then go land so we can

748

00:23:16,950 --> 00:23:13,679

stretch that launch window out probably

749

00:23:19,029 --> 00:23:16,960

to the 11th or so before we run into htv

750

00:23:20,390 --> 00:23:19,039

trying to undock so

751

00:23:22,070 --> 00:23:20,400

we have a lot of room at the back end of

752

00:23:23,669 --> 00:23:22,080

this window it's just not a lot at the

753

00:23:25,990 --> 00:23:23,679

front so if we want to maximize our

754

00:23:27,830 --> 00:23:26,000

opportunities and again with all the

755

00:23:30,390 --> 00:23:27,840

tdrs scheduling work the the russian

756

00:23:31,669 --> 00:23:30,400

work the esa work the japanese work

757

00:23:33,110 --> 00:23:31,679

our shuttle work and then all the other

758

00:23:34,470 --> 00:23:33,120

work on the range it'd be kind of nice

759

00:23:36,710 --> 00:23:34,480

to have it happen on the day you planned

760

00:23:38,230 --> 00:23:36,720

it rather than just constantly reworking

761

00:23:40,950 --> 00:23:38,240

it all so we'd really like to try to

762

00:23:42,710 --> 00:23:40,960

keep the 24th if we can

763

00:23:44,789 --> 00:23:42,720

so that's kind of what drove us to to

764

00:23:46,390 --> 00:23:44,799

look at that we still have 10 cycles

765

00:23:48,470 --> 00:23:46,400

left on the tank plus a launch so

766

00:23:49,430 --> 00:23:48,480

there's no no worry about using one up

767

00:23:51,750 --> 00:23:49,440

there

768

00:23:53,750 --> 00:23:51,760

and if you look at the true risk to the

769

00:23:55,190 --> 00:23:53,760

atv not docking

770

00:23:56,789 --> 00:23:55,200

they're either going to have a problem

771

00:23:59,190 --> 00:23:56,799

in their in their rendezvous systems

772

00:24:01,269 --> 00:23:59,200

that you find out pretty much right away

773

00:24:03,029 --> 00:24:01,279

or it's going to be a docking mechanism

774

00:24:04,390 --> 00:24:03,039

problem when you first get there neither

775

00:24:06,310 --> 00:24:04,400

of those two problems have shown up

776

00:24:07,750 --> 00:24:06,320

they're using uh you know russian

777

00:24:09,590 --> 00:24:07,760

pedigree hardware and the docking system

778

00:24:11,350 --> 00:24:09,600

they're going to the the sm aft port

779

00:24:12,870 --> 00:24:11,360

which is a very well known docking port

780

00:24:14,230 --> 00:24:12,880

so the actual risk of them having a

781

00:24:16,070 --> 00:24:14,240

problem during docking that would make

782

00:24:17,990 --> 00:24:16,080

us need to bail out of that launch are

783

00:24:19,590 --> 00:24:18,000

extremely low

784

00:24:21,750 --> 00:24:19,600

like i said from a planning and ground

785

00:24:23,269 --> 00:24:21,760

rules perspective you you try not to put

786

00:24:24,789 --> 00:24:23,279

yourself there if you can avoid it but

787

00:24:25,830 --> 00:24:24,799

if you if if it's something to do as

788

00:24:27,750 --> 00:24:25,840

long as you look at what you're really

789

00:24:29,190 --> 00:24:27,760

doing and we did in this case it's not

790

00:24:30,390 --> 00:24:29,200

that big a deal so so that worked out

791

00:24:32,630 --> 00:24:30,400

pretty good for us

792

00:24:34,710 --> 00:24:32,640

um on the tank side and and from a

793

00:24:37,350 --> 00:24:34,720

factor safety when we're really at risk

794

00:24:38,470 --> 00:24:37,360

kind of what made this problem hard is

795

00:24:39,830 --> 00:24:38,480

is uh

796

00:24:41,430 --> 00:24:39,840

you know there's uh there's a set of

797

00:24:42,950 --> 00:24:41,440

fasteners and really the way this works

798

00:24:44,390 --> 00:24:42,960

is the stringer comes up and then it

799

00:24:46,470 --> 00:24:44,400

kind of bends out a little bit as it

800

00:24:48,310 --> 00:24:46,480

goes across what we call a cord and that

801  
00:24:51,590 --> 00:24:48,320  
cord is the big chunk of metal that then

802  
00:24:53,750 --> 00:24:51,600  
bolts to the the uh the oxygen tank um

803  
00:24:55,830 --> 00:24:53,760  
the liquid oxygen tank as that liquid

804  
00:24:58,310 --> 00:24:55,840  
oxygen tank shrinks it puts stress into

805  
00:25:00,149 --> 00:24:58,320  
these fasteners in this in this uh in

806  
00:25:01,190 --> 00:25:00,159  
this cord that are that are on the

807  
00:25:02,950 --> 00:25:01,200  
stringer

808  
00:25:05,190 --> 00:25:02,960  
and each fastener sees a different load

809  
00:25:07,430 --> 00:25:05,200  
at different times so the top couple see

810  
00:25:09,029 --> 00:25:07,440  
the highest load during that initial

811  
00:25:10,549 --> 00:25:09,039  
thermal shock when the when the liquid

812  
00:25:12,789 --> 00:25:10,559  
level passes over and this thing shrinks

813  
00:25:14,470 --> 00:25:12,799

right up and it kind of pulls and tears

814

00:25:16,470 --> 00:25:14,480

at those top couple fasteners

815

00:25:17,669 --> 00:25:16,480

once the locks tank is fully loaded and

816

00:25:19,830 --> 00:25:17,679

you have the whole weight of that tank

817

00:25:22,470 --> 00:25:19,840

now pushing down on the inner tank the

818

00:25:24,950 --> 00:25:22,480

next set of fasteners three four five

819

00:25:26,789 --> 00:25:24,960

six seven eight start to see the highest

820

00:25:28,789 --> 00:25:26,799

load so once you're fully loaded and

821

00:25:30,870 --> 00:25:28,799

then lifting off they start to see the

822

00:25:32,870 --> 00:25:30,880

highest load so at different times we

823

00:25:34,470 --> 00:25:32,880

screen different fasteners the the

824

00:25:35,990 --> 00:25:34,480

fractography and the failure analysis

825

00:25:38,310 --> 00:25:36,000

show that these cracks are starting up

826

00:25:40,070 --> 00:25:38,320

in the tops of the stringers so we're

827

00:25:41,750 --> 00:25:40,080

confident that loading is a good screen

828

00:25:43,750 --> 00:25:41,760

but it's not a proof screen for us we

829

00:25:46,149 --> 00:25:43,760

can't the analysis shows that it's not a

830

00:25:47,750 --> 00:25:46,159

100 screen to say all fasteners will be

831

00:25:50,149 --> 00:25:47,760

cleared no cracks can occur after we've

832

00:25:52,470 --> 00:25:50,159

loaded the tank ascent still could cause

833

00:25:53,909 --> 00:25:52,480

a few cracks so that's why we went ahead

834

00:25:57,430 --> 00:25:53,919

put this radius block mod on there just

835

00:25:59,190 --> 00:25:57,440

to to lock that down so uh with this mod

836

00:26:00,630 --> 00:25:59,200

we're not going to see cracks the uh

837

00:26:01,909 --> 00:26:00,640

we've added capability almost doubled

838

00:26:04,149 --> 00:26:01,919

the capability and strength of these

839

00:26:04,870 --> 00:26:04,159

things um based on all the testing we've

840

00:26:06,870 --> 00:26:04,880

done

841

00:26:08,549 --> 00:26:06,880

and so we know that the the oxide is is

842

00:26:09,510 --> 00:26:08,559

in really good shape on the hydrogen

843

00:26:11,190 --> 00:26:09,520

side

844

00:26:12,870 --> 00:26:11,200

the analysis is we're not in a factor

845

00:26:14,950 --> 00:26:12,880

safety one because that would say that

846

00:26:16,070 --> 00:26:14,960

you're probably cracking we know that

847

00:26:17,750 --> 00:26:16,080

we're not cracking because we've tanked

848

00:26:19,190 --> 00:26:17,760

twice we've x-rayed

849

00:26:20,549 --> 00:26:19,200

but again we don't want to just rely on

850

00:26:22,789 --> 00:26:20,559

that small data set so we did all the

851

00:26:24,549 --> 00:26:22,799

analysis and that's where the fuzz on

852

00:26:25,350 --> 00:26:24,559

what the number really is starts to come

853

00:26:26,950 --> 00:26:25,360

in

854

00:26:28,630 --> 00:26:26,960

because it's not the normal weight when

855

00:26:29,909 --> 00:26:28,640

you normally compute a factor of safety

856

00:26:31,669 --> 00:26:29,919

you're doing it from an analysis

857

00:26:34,149 --> 00:26:31,679

standpoint and you're doing it as a

858

00:26:35,909 --> 00:26:34,159

design tool to then allow you margin to

859

00:26:37,269 --> 00:26:35,919

be wrong in that design this is kind of

860

00:26:39,190 --> 00:26:37,279

a more test

861

00:26:40,789 --> 00:26:39,200

factor of safety in fact it's probably

862

00:26:41,830 --> 00:26:40,799

not even fair to call it a factor of

863

00:26:44,149 --> 00:26:41,840

safety the

864

00:26:46,149 --> 00:26:44,159

the academics would probably cringe at

865

00:26:47,750 --> 00:26:46,159

us using it that way but

866

00:26:49,190 --> 00:26:47,760

but it's really more of a test test

867

00:26:51,029 --> 00:26:49,200

derived margin that you're able to show

868

00:26:53,750 --> 00:26:51,039

in the part and that number is greater

869

00:26:55,029 --> 00:26:53,760

than one um we have rules in the books

870

00:26:56,549 --> 00:26:55,039

to say what that number has to be when

871

00:26:57,830 --> 00:26:56,559

you're designing something and that's

872

00:26:59,269 --> 00:26:57,840

kind of what happened you know we could

873

00:27:01,029 --> 00:26:59,279

go back and forth as to are we meeting

874

00:27:02,310 --> 00:27:01,039

that rule or not we know we're not

875

00:27:03,990 --> 00:27:02,320

because we're we're cracking we

876

00:27:06,310 --> 00:27:04,000

shouldn't be cracking so we know the

877

00:27:07,830 --> 00:27:06,320

design is a little deficient here and

878

00:27:10,870 --> 00:27:07,840

it's not the design so much as it is the

879

00:27:12,230 --> 00:27:10,880

bad metal that's causing that problem

880

00:27:15,350 --> 00:27:12,240

but rather than bicker about whether the

881

00:27:16,870 --> 00:27:15,360

number's 1.5 1.4 we just kind of said

882

00:27:18,070 --> 00:27:16,880

you know there's a cloud on that number

883

00:27:20,630 --> 00:27:18,080

so we're going to accept that it's less

884

00:27:22,470 --> 00:27:20,640

than what's needed and we're going to go

885

00:27:24,230 --> 00:27:22,480

lay out the risks and and the reasons

886

00:27:28,870 --> 00:27:24,240

why we're okay to fly i don't know if

887

00:27:32,710 --> 00:27:30,549

okay fair enough

888

00:27:34,710 --> 00:27:32,720

marcia dunn yes marsha done associated

889

00:27:37,110 --> 00:27:34,720

press probably for bill or mike mores

890

00:27:39,830 --> 00:27:37,120

for the soyuz fly around if it's done is

891

00:27:41,590 --> 00:27:39,840

that simply for historic

892

00:27:43,990 --> 00:27:41,600

photography purposes or is there some

893

00:27:46,389 --> 00:27:44,000

engineering technical aspect of it

894

00:27:48,470 --> 00:27:46,399

there's an engineering technical aspect

895

00:27:51,269 --> 00:27:48,480

you know we do the shuttle fly around we

896

00:27:52,950 --> 00:27:51,279

get a chance to see the station kind of

897

00:27:54,549 --> 00:27:52,960

if you look at it you know we fly around

898

00:27:56,070 --> 00:27:54,559

this way with this fly around we're

899

00:27:57,750 --> 00:27:56,080

gonna get a chance to see some some

900

00:28:00,149 --> 00:27:57,760

portions of the trust in some areas that

901  
00:28:01,830 --> 00:28:00,159  
we've not seen before so we'll get a

902  
00:28:03,750 --> 00:28:01,840  
chance from an engineering standpoint to

903  
00:28:05,430 --> 00:28:03,760  
capture some images of some areas that

904  
00:28:07,190 --> 00:28:05,440  
we have not looked at which we would

905  
00:28:08,950 --> 00:28:07,200  
like to go look at so there's that piece

906  
00:28:10,870 --> 00:28:08,960  
which we think is good

907  
00:28:12,470 --> 00:28:10,880  
we also look at this as

908  
00:28:13,830 --> 00:28:12,480  
some when the shuttle retires in the

909  
00:28:15,909 --> 00:28:13,840  
future we're going to want to go ahead

910  
00:28:17,590 --> 00:28:15,919  
and continue to do fly arounds we use

911  
00:28:20,230 --> 00:28:17,600  
that data a lot from the shuttle fly

912  
00:28:22,950 --> 00:28:20,240  
around to go look for micro meteoroid

913  
00:28:24,950 --> 00:28:22,960

debris to the to the station we also

914

00:28:26,630 --> 00:28:24,960

look for blankets that are degrading we

915

00:28:28,789 --> 00:28:26,640

look for the radiator you know that

916

00:28:30,630 --> 00:28:28,799

that's popped up so we use it as an

917

00:28:32,470 --> 00:28:30,640

engineering evaluation of the overall

918

00:28:33,909 --> 00:28:32,480

external health of the station we're

919

00:28:36,149 --> 00:28:33,919

going to want to do the same thing when

920

00:28:37,909 --> 00:28:36,159

the shuttle retires with the soyuz so in

921

00:28:39,590 --> 00:28:37,919

a sense this is preparation for that

922

00:28:40,870 --> 00:28:39,600

activity it allows us to gain some

923

00:28:43,190 --> 00:28:40,880

experience of how we would do it with

924

00:28:45,990 --> 00:28:43,200

the soyuz how we would minimize the the

925

00:28:48,230 --> 00:28:46,000

impact of the soyuz departure to still

926

00:28:50,389 --> 00:28:48,240

get that fly around kind of data so we

927

00:28:51,990 --> 00:28:50,399

look at it as an engineering evaluation

928

00:28:54,070 --> 00:28:52,000

and and the way we've got it scheduled

929

00:28:56,310 --> 00:28:54,080

is it's kind of a

930

00:28:58,950 --> 00:28:56,320

you know it's okay from a flight uh

931

00:29:00,389 --> 00:28:58,960

readiness reviews board standpoint but

932

00:29:01,830 --> 00:29:00,399

it's really up to the team to see what

933

00:29:03,909 --> 00:29:01,840

happens if we have to do a focused

934

00:29:06,149 --> 00:29:03,919

inspection or we have any other things

935

00:29:08,310 --> 00:29:06,159

that go long on the evas we will not go

936

00:29:10,070 --> 00:29:08,320

do this soyuz fly around the russians

937

00:29:11,990 --> 00:29:10,080

still have to review it they've taken a

938

00:29:13,750 --> 00:29:12,000

cursory look at it it looks okay from

939

00:29:15,510 --> 00:29:13,760

their standpoint but they still have got

940

00:29:17,669 --> 00:29:15,520

to go give their formal blessing and

941

00:29:19,430 --> 00:29:17,679

agree to it the crew's seen some of the

942

00:29:21,110 --> 00:29:19,440

procedures they've looked at it and if

943

00:29:23,029 --> 00:29:21,120

they don't like it they'll wave off so

944

00:29:25,269 --> 00:29:23,039

it's not a guarantee by any chance we'll

945

00:29:27,190 --> 00:29:25,279

go do this but if everything comes out

946

00:29:29,430 --> 00:29:27,200

the right way we'll go we'll go do this

947

00:29:31,750 --> 00:29:29,440

to capture the images both from kind of

948

00:29:34,070 --> 00:29:31,760

a historical perspective it's important

949

00:29:36,710 --> 00:29:34,080

because you know we will have the atv

950

00:29:38,789 --> 00:29:36,720

there the japanese audit excuse me the

951  
00:29:41,110 --> 00:29:38,799  
european automated transfer vehicle the

952  
00:29:43,430 --> 00:29:41,120  
japanese htv

953  
00:29:44,950 --> 00:29:43,440  
progress will be there soyuz will be

954  
00:29:47,430 --> 00:29:44,960  
there and the shuttle will be there so

955  
00:29:49,110 --> 00:29:47,440  
it's a it's a pretty unique period in

956  
00:29:50,950 --> 00:29:49,120  
the history of station with all these

957  
00:29:52,710 --> 00:29:50,960  
vehicles here to capture some images of

958  
00:29:54,310 --> 00:29:52,720  
that so that has an aspect to it but

959  
00:29:55,750 --> 00:29:54,320  
there's also this engineering aspect to

960  
00:29:57,350 --> 00:29:55,760  
capture some data of some areas we

961  
00:29:59,269 --> 00:29:57,360  
haven't seen before

962  
00:30:01,029 --> 00:29:59,279  
um thank you and for mike kleinbach i'm

963  
00:30:02,870 --> 00:30:01,039

just wondering um since this is

964

00:30:05,590 --> 00:30:02,880

discovery's last flight

965

00:30:08,870 --> 00:30:05,600

has the past four months seem to be sort

966

00:30:11,190 --> 00:30:08,880

of a reprieve for the team working on it

967

00:30:13,269 --> 00:30:11,200

and letting it be there longer for them

968

00:30:16,149 --> 00:30:13,279

to work on and and you mentioned the

969

00:30:18,789 --> 00:30:16,159

distractions i'm just wondering how you

970

00:30:21,190 --> 00:30:18,799

expect that if at all to play out

971

00:30:22,950 --> 00:30:21,200

this year in particular next week

972

00:30:24,870 --> 00:30:22,960

well i don't expect the distractions to

973

00:30:26,950 --> 00:30:24,880

come in at all i mean i i i've said

974

00:30:29,269 --> 00:30:26,960

before and repeat again today that when

975

00:30:31,190 --> 00:30:29,279

we get on console as a launch team

976  
00:30:32,870 --> 00:30:31,200  
and the processing people out the launch

977  
00:30:34,789 --> 00:30:32,880  
pad and in the orbital processing

978  
00:30:36,710 --> 00:30:34,799  
facility and and indeed elsewhere around

979  
00:30:39,430 --> 00:30:36,720  
the center when they're on the job

980  
00:30:41,669 --> 00:30:39,440  
they're they're 100 focused on that job

981  
00:30:43,750 --> 00:30:41,679  
i i don't worry about that a bit

982  
00:30:46,149 --> 00:30:43,760  
uh the distractions come when they're

983  
00:30:47,590 --> 00:30:46,159  
when they're off the job site itself and

984  
00:30:49,590 --> 00:30:47,600  
and then you know we talk about the

985  
00:30:51,590 --> 00:30:49,600  
future and and that's where that's where

986  
00:30:53,909 --> 00:30:51,600  
some of the emotions kick in when we're

987  
00:30:55,350 --> 00:30:53,919  
on console next thursday it will not be

988  
00:30:56,789 --> 00:30:55,360

an issue at all we'll be able to launch

989

00:30:58,389 --> 00:30:56,799

perfectly safely

990

00:31:00,310 --> 00:30:58,399

we also have a process in place called

991

00:31:02,230 --> 00:31:00,320

the shuttle workforce council where we

992

00:31:03,990 --> 00:31:02,240

in management get together monthly

993

00:31:06,310 --> 00:31:04,000

both on the nasa and the contractor side

994

00:31:08,549 --> 00:31:06,320

and and look system by system

995

00:31:10,630 --> 00:31:08,559

uh the workforce levels the experience

996

00:31:12,630 --> 00:31:10,640

of of all the people in those systems

997

00:31:14,789 --> 00:31:12,640

and can we safely support processing and

998

00:31:16,789 --> 00:31:14,799

launch and right now we are green across

999

00:31:18,070 --> 00:31:16,799

the board and so yeah there have been

1000

00:31:19,830 --> 00:31:18,080

some layoffs but we still have

1001  
00:31:23,029 --> 00:31:19,840  
sufficient people here to to perform the

1002  
00:31:25,669 --> 00:31:23,039  
jobs perfectly safely so no issue there

1003  
00:31:27,750 --> 00:31:25,679  
um the reprieve i don't know it'd be

1004  
00:31:30,549 --> 00:31:27,760  
you like to open christmas presents on

1005  
00:31:32,310 --> 00:31:30,559  
december 25th you know maybe

1006  
00:31:34,950 --> 00:31:32,320  
it'd be like opening christmas presents

1007  
00:31:37,029 --> 00:31:34,960  
a week late i guess i don't know it uh

1008  
00:31:38,870 --> 00:31:37,039  
people people enjoy the launch uh we

1009  
00:31:40,789 --> 00:31:38,880  
need to get on and and do this get to

1010  
00:31:42,470 --> 00:31:40,799  
scurvy on orbit perform her last mission

1011  
00:31:44,470 --> 00:31:42,480  
and bring her home and and get into

1012  
00:31:45,590 --> 00:31:44,480  
transition and retirement reprieve i

1013  
00:31:46,389 --> 00:31:45,600

don't know if that's the right word for

1014

00:31:52,070 --> 00:31:46,399

it

1015

00:31:53,669 --> 00:31:52,080

what we'll get next thursday

1016

00:31:54,950 --> 00:31:53,679

okay we'll take a question from todd

1017

00:31:56,870 --> 00:31:54,960

halverson and then we'll go to the

1018

00:31:58,789 --> 00:31:56,880

johnson space center for questions all

1019

00:32:01,509 --> 00:31:58,799

right thanks todd halverson of florida

1020

00:32:03,110 --> 00:32:01,519

today for i think mike moses um

1021

00:32:06,149 --> 00:32:03,120

whenever you

1022

00:32:08,149 --> 00:32:06,159

do modifications that are as extensive

1023

00:32:10,710 --> 00:32:08,159

as what you've done with the external

1024

00:32:12,950 --> 00:32:10,720

tank in this case there always has to be

1025

00:32:16,149 --> 00:32:12,960

a concern that you might introduce a

1026

00:32:17,909 --> 00:32:16,159

hazard that goes unrecognized

1027

00:32:20,389 --> 00:32:17,919

i i'm wondering what about this

1028

00:32:23,269 --> 00:32:20,399

situation right here makes you feel

1029

00:32:24,710 --> 00:32:23,279

confident that this tank is safe to go

1030

00:32:27,350 --> 00:32:24,720

fly

1031

00:32:29,990 --> 00:32:27,360

that's a good question so we you know we

1032

00:32:31,990 --> 00:32:30,000

made the decision to modify this tank uh

1033

00:32:33,909 --> 00:32:32,000

back in the in the early january time

1034

00:32:36,630 --> 00:32:33,919

frame and we spent a lot of time before

1035

00:32:38,310 --> 00:32:36,640

we made that go uh working on tests and

1036

00:32:40,549 --> 00:32:38,320

analysis to show that very thing that we

1037

00:32:44,710 --> 00:32:40,559

would do no harm uh and that we would be

1038

00:32:45,990 --> 00:32:44,720

okay so on the surface literally um you

1039

00:32:48,549 --> 00:32:46,000

know you have to take the foam off and

1040

00:32:50,310 --> 00:32:48,559

then reapply it and so we looked at the

1041

00:32:52,870 --> 00:32:50,320

the amount of sprays that were required

1042

00:32:54,710 --> 00:32:52,880

how those foam bonds would go with each

1043

00:32:56,230 --> 00:32:54,720

other you know the the flange of the

1044

00:32:58,870 --> 00:32:56,240

tank is one of the last things closed

1045

00:32:59,990 --> 00:32:58,880

out and it's a spray done automated at

1046

00:33:02,470 --> 00:33:00,000

the assembly plant and here we'd be

1047

00:33:03,750 --> 00:33:02,480

doing it manually um we talked about the

1048

00:33:05,029 --> 00:33:03,760

the amount of material being sprayed and

1049

00:33:06,389 --> 00:33:05,039

it's in family with everything we've

1050

00:33:08,310 --> 00:33:06,399

done here before

1051

00:33:10,549 --> 00:33:08,320

in florida and what we did was the the

1052

00:33:12,149 --> 00:33:10,559

teams at michoud basically practiced on

1053

00:33:13,990 --> 00:33:12,159

test panels to develop the procedures

1054

00:33:15,909 --> 00:33:14,000

they would use we came down here dryer

1055

00:33:17,110 --> 00:33:15,919

ran them and then and then executed it

1056

00:33:19,269 --> 00:33:17,120

and so we kind of followed all our

1057

00:33:20,789 --> 00:33:19,279

normal processes for how we repair foam

1058

00:33:22,470 --> 00:33:20,799

uh and so that that gave us good

1059

00:33:23,590 --> 00:33:22,480

confidence that that we were able to

1060

00:33:25,750 --> 00:33:23,600

take the foam off in the first place

1061

00:33:27,509 --> 00:33:25,760

because we know we can go put it back on

1062

00:33:29,269 --> 00:33:27,519

safely that's a little different than

1063

00:33:30,710 --> 00:33:29,279

the hydrogen flange if we it's one of

1064

00:33:33,110 --> 00:33:30,720

the reasons we're not wanting to do

1065

00:33:35,990 --> 00:33:33,120

anything to the hydrogen flange um the

1066

00:33:37,430 --> 00:33:36,000

difference is the the ox flange um the

1067

00:33:39,350 --> 00:33:37,440

bottom it's at the bottom of the tank so

1068

00:33:40,470 --> 00:33:39,360

during ascent there's always cryo there

1069

00:33:43,110 --> 00:33:40,480

it's always nice and cold on the

1070

00:33:45,669 --> 00:33:43,120

backside and so the temperatures kind of

1071

00:33:46,789 --> 00:33:45,679

it's got this nice cold back face on it

1072

00:33:48,549 --> 00:33:46,799

and so you're not worried about this

1073

00:33:50,870 --> 00:33:48,559

cryo-pumping loss where the little

1074

00:33:52,789 --> 00:33:50,880

pockets of air liquidize and then as you

1075

00:33:54,950 --> 00:33:52,799

go up they flash and push and pop the

1076

00:33:56,710 --> 00:33:54,960

foam off the tank on the hydrogen side

1077

00:33:58,470 --> 00:33:56,720

that's the top of the tank so it's cold

1078

00:34:00,470 --> 00:33:58,480

and liquid at the very beginning but

1079

00:34:02,389 --> 00:34:00,480

within the first couple

1080

00:34:04,470 --> 00:34:02,399

minutes of ascent that that level's

1081

00:34:05,909 --> 00:34:04,480

dropping in the tank that now gets warm

1082

00:34:07,909 --> 00:34:05,919

and that heats up and now you can have

1083

00:34:09,589 --> 00:34:07,919

these cryo-pumping effects we learned

1084

00:34:11,349 --> 00:34:09,599

that lesson pretty well during all the

1085

00:34:13,589 --> 00:34:11,359

the return to flight stuff for for after

1086

00:34:15,349 --> 00:34:13,599

columbia and so we're not confident that

1087

00:34:17,510 --> 00:34:15,359

we'd be able to close that flange back

1088

00:34:19,349 --> 00:34:17,520

out if we took foam off there in large

1089

00:34:22,149 --> 00:34:19,359

quantities because that's a very well

1090

00:34:23,430 --> 00:34:22,159

controlled minimizes all the voids and

1091

00:34:24,869 --> 00:34:23,440

it's just not the same rigor that we

1092

00:34:26,550 --> 00:34:24,879

could do here it's not to say we

1093

00:34:27,990 --> 00:34:26,560

couldn't we just decided rapidly we

1094

00:34:28,950 --> 00:34:28,000

didn't need to go there so we wanted to

1095

00:34:30,470 --> 00:34:28,960

make sure

1096

00:34:31,909 --> 00:34:30,480

uh let's show that we can analyze our

1097

00:34:33,669 --> 00:34:31,919

way out of the hydrogen side if we have

1098

00:34:35,109 --> 00:34:33,679

to and we did

1099

00:34:36,629 --> 00:34:35,119

so that's the foam part so that's that

1100

00:34:38,149 --> 00:34:36,639

was my first concern is before we do

1101

00:34:40,710 --> 00:34:38,159

anything can i put it back together the

1102

00:34:42,629 --> 00:34:40,720

right way and then on the mod side this

1103

00:34:44,310 --> 00:34:42,639

mods very much in family with other

1104

00:34:46,790 --> 00:34:44,320

things they do to the tank

1105

00:34:49,430 --> 00:34:46,800

when they have damage either the the

1106

00:34:51,750 --> 00:34:49,440

riveting tool kind of jumps off and and

1107

00:34:54,069 --> 00:34:51,760

smacks into the side of a stringer or it

1108

00:34:56,310 --> 00:34:54,079

gets handling damage or a crack develops

1109

00:34:58,069 --> 00:34:56,320

um this is this is the way they repair

1110

00:35:00,710 --> 00:34:58,079

that they uh they pull it off they put a

1111

00:35:02,790 --> 00:35:00,720

doubler on they put a radius block on so

1112

00:35:04,390 --> 00:35:02,800

it's a known process the guys doing the

1113

00:35:05,510 --> 00:35:04,400

work did it the same exact way they

1114

00:35:07,270 --> 00:35:05,520

would have done it had this happened at

1115

00:35:09,270 --> 00:35:07,280

the plant we just now did it to every

1116

00:35:11,510 --> 00:35:09,280

stringer instead of three or four

1117

00:35:14,950 --> 00:35:11,520

stringers on every tank um and then

1118

00:35:17,109 --> 00:35:14,960

lastly uh we did all the math to show

1119

00:35:18,950 --> 00:35:17,119

with actual test and analysis that it

1120

00:35:20,550 --> 00:35:18,960

didn't actually do any harm

1121

00:35:22,710 --> 00:35:20,560

in all the tests we did to find the root

1122

00:35:24,470 --> 00:35:22,720

cause we then took all those runs and

1123

00:35:26,069 --> 00:35:24,480

did them again with the mod on to show

1124

00:35:27,670 --> 00:35:26,079

that it didn't cause the same problem

1125

00:35:29,750 --> 00:35:27,680

again so once we figured out how to

1126

00:35:31,670 --> 00:35:29,760

recreate the failures in the lab we then

1127

00:35:33,589 --> 00:35:31,680

modified those just like we modified the

1128

00:35:35,190 --> 00:35:33,599

tank and ran the test again and showed

1129

00:35:37,270 --> 00:35:35,200

ultimate capability was was greatly

1130

00:35:38,870 --> 00:35:37,280

improved

1131

00:35:40,310 --> 00:35:38,880

you back up to the what makes me sleep

1132

00:35:42,069 --> 00:35:40,320

good tonight is the common sense part

1133

00:35:44,069 --> 00:35:42,079

you know we're putting this little thin

1134

00:35:45,589 --> 00:35:44,079

piece of aluminum band-aid on the part

1135

00:35:47,270 --> 00:35:45,599

of the stringer that's wrapped up over a

1136

00:35:49,589 --> 00:35:47,280

big thick aluminum cord so if you look

1137

00:35:51,270 --> 00:35:49,599

at the the total flexure of the system

1138

00:35:52,790 --> 00:35:51,280

we're basically adding a little tiny bit

1139

00:35:55,109 --> 00:35:52,800

of aluminum on top of a big thick piece

1140

00:35:55,829 --> 00:35:55,119

of aluminum so just common sense wise

1141

00:35:57,109 --> 00:35:55,839

you look at that and you feel

1142

00:35:58,230 --> 00:35:57,119

comfortable with it

1143

00:35:59,270 --> 00:35:58,240

that's a good thing but it's also the

1144

00:36:01,349 --> 00:35:59,280

bad thing because that's when you stop

1145

00:36:02,870 --> 00:36:01,359

to say okay now what am i missing and i

1146

00:36:04,230 --> 00:36:02,880

think we did all the homework there to

1147

00:36:05,670 --> 00:36:04,240

show that we're not missing anything we

1148

00:36:07,750 --> 00:36:05,680

really are truly doing no harm on this

1149

00:36:10,310 --> 00:36:07,760

one i think i'd add a little bit to what

1150

00:36:12,390 --> 00:36:10,320

mike said we really tested this very

1151  
00:36:13,589 --> 00:36:12,400  
rigorously we actually changed the

1152  
00:36:15,030 --> 00:36:13,599  
loading because what you're worried

1153  
00:36:17,349 --> 00:36:15,040  
about when you put a little piece in to

1154  
00:36:19,270 --> 00:36:17,359  
stiffen an area have you now transferred

1155  
00:36:21,589 --> 00:36:19,280  
that load to another area that you

1156  
00:36:23,910 --> 00:36:21,599  
didn't intend for that load to move to

1157  
00:36:25,589 --> 00:36:23,920  
so they did extensive testing where we

1158  
00:36:27,109 --> 00:36:25,599  
looked at that from a visual standpoint

1159  
00:36:29,750 --> 00:36:27,119  
we got to watch a movie where you could

1160  
00:36:31,510 --> 00:36:29,760  
actually watch the load get transferred

1161  
00:36:33,750 --> 00:36:31,520  
to those other areas to make sure that

1162  
00:36:35,670 --> 00:36:33,760  
there was not an adverse effect of that

1163  
00:36:37,589 --> 00:36:35,680

occurring then they actually changed the

1164

00:36:38,310 --> 00:36:37,599

way they loaded so they actually loaded

1165

00:36:43,109 --> 00:36:38,320

the

1166

00:36:44,870 --> 00:36:43,119

doubler or no little band-aid put on top

1167

00:36:46,710 --> 00:36:44,880

of it to see what would happen if that

1168

00:36:48,790 --> 00:36:46,720

occurred and then they did extensive

1169

00:36:50,550 --> 00:36:48,800

finite element analysis to go look at

1170

00:36:52,230 --> 00:36:50,560

what this does from a math standpoint it

1171

00:36:54,390 --> 00:36:52,240

compared the modification with and

1172

00:36:56,390 --> 00:36:54,400

without the stringer and then another

1173

00:36:59,109 --> 00:36:56,400

piece just to be even doubly sure is

1174

00:37:01,510 --> 00:36:59,119

that had limitations in the model so the

1175

00:37:03,910 --> 00:37:01,520

nesc is off running a different math

1176  
00:37:06,710 --> 00:37:03,920  
model that will do exactly the same kind

1177  
00:37:08,870 --> 00:37:06,720  
of thing to see if they can

1178  
00:37:10,069 --> 00:37:08,880  
find something else this model that they

1179  
00:37:12,390 --> 00:37:10,079  
ran had

1180  
00:37:15,109 --> 00:37:12,400  
elastic or that's where the metal uh you

1181  
00:37:16,710 --> 00:37:15,119  
know yields but then returns back we

1182  
00:37:18,710 --> 00:37:16,720  
think it goes into the plastic region

1183  
00:37:21,270 --> 00:37:18,720  
where it takes a set or stays in a bent

1184  
00:37:23,190 --> 00:37:21,280  
configuration the nesc model will look

1185  
00:37:25,030 --> 00:37:23,200  
at that plastic configuration and see if

1186  
00:37:26,550 --> 00:37:25,040  
that causes any problems and we didn't

1187  
00:37:28,230 --> 00:37:26,560  
consider that a constraint to flight

1188  
00:37:30,069 --> 00:37:28,240

that that work gets done because of the

1189

00:37:32,550 --> 00:37:30,079

testing we've done but they're off

1190

00:37:34,230 --> 00:37:32,560

running that as well so so we are we

1191

00:37:35,910 --> 00:37:34,240

were very cognizant that we could be

1192

00:37:38,150 --> 00:37:35,920

doing something here that takes a

1193

00:37:40,950 --> 00:37:38,160

situation that was bounded and creates a

1194

00:37:42,069 --> 00:37:40,960

situation that we don't understand so i

1195

00:37:44,710 --> 00:37:42,079

would tell you the teams did a

1196

00:37:46,310 --> 00:37:44,720

phenomenal job of of doing this testing

1197

00:37:48,390 --> 00:37:46,320

and pulling the work together and i i

1198

00:37:50,470 --> 00:37:48,400

couldn't be prouder of what they've done

1199

00:37:52,870 --> 00:37:50,480

how they worked as a you know a combined

1200

00:37:55,990 --> 00:37:52,880

group from from marshall and langley and

1201

00:37:57,990 --> 00:37:56,000

jsc and the maf team came and pulled

1202

00:38:00,310 --> 00:37:58,000

together and really did a phenomenal job

1203

00:38:01,670 --> 00:38:00,320

and and to mike's point

1204

00:38:03,430 --> 00:38:01,680

you know a lot of these folks some of

1205

00:38:05,750 --> 00:38:03,440

them in the tank world have been were

1206

00:38:07,510 --> 00:38:05,760

laid off they were already in other jobs

1207

00:38:09,510 --> 00:38:07,520

and we called them back to come back and

1208

00:38:11,670 --> 00:38:09,520

do some of this work and they were glad

1209

00:38:13,589 --> 00:38:11,680

to come back and they gave it their all

1210

00:38:15,990 --> 00:38:13,599

to make this this vehicle ready to go

1211

00:38:18,069 --> 00:38:16,000

fly so when i think about the space

1212

00:38:20,069 --> 00:38:18,079

flight team i i think back of all those

1213

00:38:22,550 --> 00:38:20,079

folks that i that i've seen at math and

1214

00:38:24,230 --> 00:38:22,560

the folks that spent many hours you know

1215

00:38:26,230 --> 00:38:24,240

a lot of time over the holidays over the

1216

00:38:28,470 --> 00:38:26,240

christmas time over uh new year's

1217

00:38:29,990 --> 00:38:28,480

working this problem and there was no

1218

00:38:31,430 --> 00:38:30,000

question about their dedication to what

1219

00:38:33,589 --> 00:38:31,440

they were doing they really want to see

1220

00:38:36,310 --> 00:38:33,599

this vehicle fly and help out space

1221

00:38:37,990 --> 00:38:36,320

station and move forward

1222

00:38:41,190 --> 00:38:38,000

let's go to johnson space center in

1223

00:38:45,349 --> 00:38:42,990

hi this is robert perlman with

1224

00:38:46,470 --> 00:38:45,359

collectspace.com uh with two questions

1225

00:38:48,950 --> 00:38:46,480

if i may

1226

00:38:51,510 --> 00:38:48,960

um for mike mores

1227

00:38:52,550 --> 00:38:51,520

between november and now has the iss

1228

00:38:54,870 --> 00:38:52,560

program

1229

00:38:57,190 --> 00:38:54,880

requested any additional payloads to be

1230

00:38:59,349 --> 00:38:57,200

added to the mid-deck to fixes for their

1231

00:39:01,510 --> 00:38:59,359

systems or anything else

1232

00:39:04,390 --> 00:39:01,520

let's see i think we've uh we might have

1233

00:39:06,150 --> 00:39:04,400

put a new fluid jumper on board um for

1234

00:39:08,950 --> 00:39:06,160

one of the esa modules and other than

1235

00:39:11,109 --> 00:39:08,960

that i don't think there was anything um

1236

00:39:13,510 --> 00:39:11,119

the only real changeouts were uh in

1237

00:39:15,589 --> 00:39:13,520

regard to the crew swap to get the right

1238

00:39:18,069 --> 00:39:15,599

sizing m using gloves

1239

00:39:20,710 --> 00:39:18,079

and then personal gear on board for uh

1240

00:39:23,829 --> 00:39:20,720

for steve bowen

1241

00:39:25,910 --> 00:39:23,839

great and for bill gerstenmaier i'm just

1242

00:39:28,630 --> 00:39:25,920

wondering if during the fr today there

1243

00:39:31,910 --> 00:39:28,640

was any discussion about the impact to

1244

00:39:33,990 --> 00:39:31,920

the mission if there was any if um if

1245

00:39:36,470 --> 00:39:34,000

mar on march 4th the government was

1246

00:39:38,390 --> 00:39:36,480

unable to pass a new budget and

1247

00:39:40,630 --> 00:39:38,400

there was a government furlough was

1248

00:39:42,790 --> 00:39:40,640

there any talk about that today no we

1249

00:39:44,390 --> 00:39:42,800

didn't discuss that

1250

00:39:46,150 --> 00:39:44,400

okay let's go to the phone bridge where

1251

00:39:47,990 --> 00:39:46,160

i believe denise ciao is standing by

1252

00:39:50,550 --> 00:39:48,000

with a question

1253

00:39:52,310 --> 00:39:50,560

hi thanks denise ciao with space.com um

1254

00:39:53,670 --> 00:39:52,320

with a question for bill gerstenmaier uh

1255

00:39:55,829 --> 00:39:53,680

you mentioned that it's sort of a unique

1256

00:39:57,270 --> 00:39:55,839

time right now um in the space station's

1257

00:39:58,870 --> 00:39:57,280

history with all the international

1258

00:40:00,150 --> 00:39:58,880

partners having vehicles present and

1259

00:40:01,990 --> 00:40:00,160

docked there

1260

00:40:04,069 --> 00:40:02,000

and with discovery bringing some of the

1261

00:40:05,349 --> 00:40:04,079

last the pmn the last american edition i

1262

00:40:07,750 --> 00:40:05,359

was wondering if you could just comment

1263

00:40:10,390 --> 00:40:07,760

on the significance of that

1264

00:40:12,150 --> 00:40:10,400

yeah this is a pretty amazing time if

1265

00:40:14,950 --> 00:40:12,160

you think about it

1266

00:40:18,390 --> 00:40:14,960

you know if you look in the last month

1267

00:40:21,030 --> 00:40:18,400

you know we've had the japanese

1268

00:40:23,750 --> 00:40:21,040

htv launch from tanegashima we had a

1269

00:40:25,910 --> 00:40:23,760

progress vehicle launch from from russia

1270

00:40:28,230 --> 00:40:25,920

we've just had the esa automated

1271

00:40:30,150 --> 00:40:28,240

transfer vehicle launched from kuru

1272

00:40:32,069 --> 00:40:30,160

french guyana and then we're going to

1273

00:40:34,390 --> 00:40:32,079

have the shuttle launch

1274

00:40:36,390 --> 00:40:34,400

here as well so here we will have

1275

00:40:38,790 --> 00:40:36,400

launches from from

1276

00:40:39,910 --> 00:40:38,800

the kennedy space center uh

1277

00:40:43,030 --> 00:40:39,920

karoo

1278

00:40:44,790 --> 00:40:43,040

tanigashima and baikonur all within a

1279

00:40:46,950 --> 00:40:44,800

one-month period so

1280

00:40:49,349 --> 00:40:46,960

you talk about a pretty amazing time of

1281

00:40:51,430 --> 00:40:49,359

all these folks keeping track of all the

1282

00:40:53,190 --> 00:40:51,440

activities that have to occur and and

1283

00:40:55,270 --> 00:40:53,200

keeping the space station operational

1284

00:40:57,349 --> 00:40:55,280

it's a pretty amazing time and

1285

00:40:59,990 --> 00:40:57,359

and again you should watch the video

1286

00:41:01,030 --> 00:41:00,000

associated with this flight of the evas

1287

00:41:04,630 --> 00:41:01,040

and

1288

00:41:06,550 --> 00:41:04,640

what we're really doing in space station

1289

00:41:08,630 --> 00:41:06,560

look where the crew has to go all over

1290

00:41:10,470 --> 00:41:08,640

this truss and what they are doing out

1291

00:41:12,870 --> 00:41:10,480

on the outside of space station

1292

00:41:14,470 --> 00:41:12,880

i think maybe we take it for granted but

1293

00:41:16,630 --> 00:41:14,480

you need to step back and think about

1294

00:41:18,550 --> 00:41:16,640

what's going on in space to think about

1295

00:41:20,710 --> 00:41:18,560

all these vehicles launching in one

1296

00:41:22,309 --> 00:41:20,720

month from all these remote places all

1297

00:41:24,630 --> 00:41:22,319

these international control centers

1298

00:41:27,030 --> 00:41:24,640

working together this extremely

1299

00:41:29,349 --> 00:41:27,040

choreographed two series of evas that

1300

00:41:31,589 --> 00:41:29,359

are phenomenal across the truss

1301  
00:41:33,349 --> 00:41:31,599  
you think about space operations this is

1302  
00:41:36,150 --> 00:41:33,359  
probably the most intense space

1303  
00:41:37,990 --> 00:41:36,160  
operations time ever in in our history

1304  
00:41:40,069 --> 00:41:38,000  
and and we just kind of take it for

1305  
00:41:41,190 --> 00:41:40,079  
granted that it's just happening but i

1306  
00:41:43,430 --> 00:41:41,200  
think that the teams have done a

1307  
00:41:44,550 --> 00:41:43,440  
phenomenal job of working things they

1308  
00:41:47,030 --> 00:41:44,560  
you know we were supposed to have a

1309  
00:41:48,390 --> 00:41:47,040  
pallet to put the cargo on from htv it

1310  
00:41:50,630 --> 00:41:48,400  
was supposed to be delivered by the

1311  
00:41:52,710 --> 00:41:50,640  
shuttle if the shuttle didn't make it

1312  
00:41:54,309 --> 00:41:52,720  
so so dexter and the spiderman is

1313  
00:41:56,069 --> 00:41:54,319

holding two components waiting for the

1314

00:41:58,710 --> 00:41:56,079

pallet to be delivered by the shuttle

1315

00:42:00,309 --> 00:41:58,720

and they'll get moved over to the proper

1316

00:42:02,550 --> 00:42:00,319

pallet when the time comes but that was

1317

00:42:04,710 --> 00:42:02,560

not trivial for the teams to figure out

1318

00:42:07,030 --> 00:42:04,720

how to move all that stuff around as we

1319

00:42:08,870 --> 00:42:07,040

talked about today the htv was moved

1320

00:42:10,390 --> 00:42:08,880

from the port where it docked originally

1321

00:42:12,309 --> 00:42:10,400

on the nader and it's now sitting up at

1322

00:42:13,829 --> 00:42:12,319

the top on the zenith right and and i

1323

00:42:15,589 --> 00:42:13,839

don't know how much that got covered and

1324

00:42:17,190 --> 00:42:15,599

it got we had to have a cable that was

1325

00:42:19,190 --> 00:42:17,200

built on orbit installed because the

1326

00:42:21,030 --> 00:42:19,200

cable we were going to use was stowed in

1327

00:42:22,790 --> 00:42:21,040

the pmm on the shuttle and it wasn't

1328

00:42:25,670 --> 00:42:22,800

there so the crew manufactured a cable

1329

00:42:27,670 --> 00:42:25,680

to hook power up to the htv on orbit so

1330

00:42:31,270 --> 00:42:27,680

this team is operating in an

1331

00:42:33,349 --> 00:42:31,280

international uh amazing

1332

00:42:36,630 --> 00:42:33,359

system of operations and activities to

1333

00:42:38,630 --> 00:42:36,640

just keep all the bits and pieces

1334

00:42:40,309 --> 00:42:38,640

working and moving forward and what a

1335

00:42:41,910 --> 00:42:40,319

great team and what a great time in

1336

00:42:44,470 --> 00:42:41,920

space flight

1337

00:42:46,230 --> 00:42:44,480

denise did you have a follow-up question

1338

00:42:47,829 --> 00:42:46,240

no that's all thank you okay thank you

1339

00:42:50,309 --> 00:42:47,839

we're back here at kennedy we have about

1340

00:42:52,630 --> 00:42:50,319

five minutes left in the briefing um and

1341

00:42:56,550 --> 00:42:52,640

we'll go to dan billow

1342

00:42:57,990 --> 00:42:56,560

dan billow wesh tv uh i want to just ask

1343

00:43:00,870 --> 00:42:58,000

you to elaborate a little bit more on

1344

00:43:03,510 --> 00:43:00,880

the atv docking versus the shuttle

1345

00:43:05,510 --> 00:43:03,520

launch that day it i take it there's

1346

00:43:07,589 --> 00:43:05,520

nothing that you're concerned too

1347

00:43:08,950 --> 00:43:07,599

concerned about that that

1348

00:43:10,870 --> 00:43:08,960

could be subtle

1349

00:43:13,030 --> 00:43:10,880

that could happen with an atv docking

1350

00:43:15,270 --> 00:43:13,040

that might manifest itself hours later

1351  
00:43:16,950 --> 00:43:15,280  
or something like that i mean what what

1352  
00:43:19,030 --> 00:43:16,960  
protocol do you take to kind of make

1353  
00:43:20,710 --> 00:43:19,040  
sure that the bases are covered in

1354  
00:43:22,630 --> 00:43:20,720  
and that you know what would trip the

1355  
00:43:24,069 --> 00:43:22,640  
trigger to say

1356  
00:43:25,349 --> 00:43:24,079  
we've got a problem we can't launch or

1357  
00:43:27,829 --> 00:43:25,359  
we can't dock

1358  
00:43:30,550 --> 00:43:27,839  
well i could take a piece of that

1359  
00:43:31,589 --> 00:43:30,560  
you know as the atv approaches you know

1360  
00:43:33,589 --> 00:43:31,599  
it's going

1361  
00:43:35,030 --> 00:43:33,599  
today for example it did a practice

1362  
00:43:37,030 --> 00:43:35,040  
collision avoidance maneuver so we're

1363  
00:43:39,510 --> 00:43:37,040

testing all the thruster systems we're

1364

00:43:41,030 --> 00:43:39,520

testing the com systems so we will know

1365

00:43:43,190 --> 00:43:41,040

pretty much in advance if there's

1366

00:43:45,349 --> 00:43:43,200

something going on from an overall atv

1367

00:43:46,870 --> 00:43:45,359

standpoint and so we'll we'll know that

1368

00:43:49,349 --> 00:43:46,880

ahead of time probably even at the

1369

00:43:51,270 --> 00:43:49,359

tanking meeting that michael chair if

1370

00:43:52,790 --> 00:43:51,280

there's any major problem that could be

1371

00:43:54,390 --> 00:43:52,800

delaying the docking and we can make a

1372

00:43:56,710 --> 00:43:54,400

decision even before we start loading

1373

00:43:58,150 --> 00:43:56,720

the tank but when we're that close to

1374

00:44:00,230 --> 00:43:58,160

docking we will have checked out the

1375

00:44:02,550 --> 00:44:00,240

majority of the systems on the atv and

1376  
00:44:04,390 --> 00:44:02,560  
there will be understood it comes in and

1377  
00:44:05,510 --> 00:44:04,400  
docks it uses the

1378  
00:44:07,670 --> 00:44:05,520  
russian

1379  
00:44:09,109 --> 00:44:07,680  
system to dock to the back part of the

1380  
00:44:11,589 --> 00:44:09,119  
service module

1381  
00:44:14,550 --> 00:44:11,599  
it pretty much just

1382  
00:44:16,309 --> 00:44:14,560  
bangs in and it attaches to the end it

1383  
00:44:18,790 --> 00:44:16,319  
becomes pretty obvious whether you're

1384  
00:44:20,390 --> 00:44:18,800  
successful in docking or not

1385  
00:44:22,069 --> 00:44:20,400  
there's not a lot of mechanisms once

1386  
00:44:23,589 --> 00:44:22,079  
it's attached if it's not attached

1387  
00:44:25,270 --> 00:44:23,599  
properly and it's a soft dock

1388  
00:44:27,349 --> 00:44:25,280

configuration and that's an obvious

1389

00:44:29,510 --> 00:44:27,359

no-go we would we would scrub out and

1390

00:44:31,670 --> 00:44:29,520

not launch if it hard docks it'll be

1391

00:44:34,230 --> 00:44:31,680

obvious to us right away we want to do a

1392

00:44:35,910 --> 00:44:34,240

little thruster test on the atv and

1393

00:44:37,510 --> 00:44:35,920

we'll try to probably do that before the

1394

00:44:39,829 --> 00:44:37,520

shuttle actually comes up and docks i

1395

00:44:41,190 --> 00:44:39,839

think we changed actually in the fr we

1396

00:44:42,790 --> 00:44:41,200

talked about it one way then after the

1397

00:44:44,150 --> 00:44:42,800

meeting that the teams thought about it

1398

00:44:45,990 --> 00:44:44,160

some more and they'll do a little

1399

00:44:47,910 --> 00:44:46,000

thruster test so there's very little

1400

00:44:50,470 --> 00:44:47,920

risk of us not knowing whether this is

1401

00:44:51,910 --> 00:44:50,480

successful or not when it occurs it'll

1402

00:44:53,589 --> 00:44:51,920

be pretty cut and dried whether we can

1403

00:44:55,270 --> 00:44:53,599

launch or not we'll we'll have the right

1404

00:44:57,990 --> 00:44:55,280

discussions the right time to talk about

1405

00:44:59,829 --> 00:44:58,000

it and i would say it also you know when

1406

00:45:01,349 --> 00:44:59,839

we make the flight rules

1407

00:45:03,349 --> 00:45:01,359

you know we have to worry about crew

1408

00:45:06,470 --> 00:45:03,359

sleep shifting we have to worry about

1409

00:45:07,910 --> 00:45:06,480

crew timelines we have to worry about

1410

00:45:10,150 --> 00:45:07,920

tdrs coverage

1411

00:45:11,910 --> 00:45:10,160

and and to carry that in a generic sense

1412

00:45:13,190 --> 00:45:11,920

you really want that spacing but then

1413

00:45:15,670 --> 00:45:13,200

when you're into the actual mission

1414

00:45:17,270 --> 00:45:15,680

specifics you know the exact conditions

1415

00:45:19,589 --> 00:45:17,280

of where the satellites are you know the

1416

00:45:21,190 --> 00:45:19,599

actual crew sleep shift time frames you

1417

00:45:22,870 --> 00:45:21,200

know all these activities and then you

1418

00:45:24,630 --> 00:45:22,880

can go look and say hey in this unique

1419

00:45:27,829 --> 00:45:24,640

situation doesn't make sense to go do

1420

00:45:30,309 --> 00:45:27,839

this so we see it as a as a good kind of

1421

00:45:32,470 --> 00:45:30,319

risk decision that we would like to get

1422

00:45:34,309 --> 00:45:32,480

three opportunities for the shuttle to

1423

00:45:36,630 --> 00:45:34,319

launch this gives us the first one and

1424

00:45:38,309 --> 00:45:36,640

we see that the chances of us

1425

00:45:39,910 --> 00:45:38,319

having a problem with atv low enough

1426

00:45:41,990 --> 00:45:39,920

that it makes sense to move forward and

1427

00:45:43,990 --> 00:45:42,000

if we do we can react to it and it's

1428

00:45:46,230 --> 00:45:44,000

it's an extra cycle on the tank and and

1429

00:45:47,829 --> 00:45:46,240

we're where we need to be okay we'll

1430

00:45:50,870 --> 00:45:47,839

take uh take one question from bill

1431

00:45:52,550 --> 00:45:50,880

harwood and and wrap up with marcia dunn

1432

00:45:53,910 --> 00:45:52,560

mike uh you guys had some problems with

1433

00:45:55,829 --> 00:45:53,920

the gup when you were hooking it back up

1434

00:45:56,870 --> 00:45:55,839

after roll out and i guess you swapped

1435

00:45:58,950 --> 00:45:56,880

out a seal

1436

00:46:01,190 --> 00:45:58,960

are you confident that when you guys i

1437

00:46:03,430 --> 00:46:01,200

mean obviously you're confident but but

1438

00:46:04,710 --> 00:46:03,440

given the vacancies of that system why

1439

00:46:07,109 --> 00:46:04,720

are you confident

1440

00:46:09,589 --> 00:46:07,119

yeah so what we learned um

1441

00:46:11,510 --> 00:46:09,599

after the uh the scrub back on november

1442

00:46:13,030 --> 00:46:11,520

5th

1443

00:46:14,630 --> 00:46:13,040

well let me let me back up you for that

1444

00:46:16,309 --> 00:46:14,640

so after the first set of gup scrubs we

1445

00:46:17,430 --> 00:46:16,319

had on on two different missions we

1446

00:46:18,630 --> 00:46:17,440

learned that the we call it

1447

00:46:20,950 --> 00:46:18,640

concentricity which is kind of the

1448

00:46:22,790 --> 00:46:20,960

alignment of the the plate on the tank

1449

00:46:25,430 --> 00:46:22,800

itself with the ground carrier plate

1450

00:46:27,190 --> 00:46:25,440

that we bolt to that here at kennedy

1451  
00:46:28,870 --> 00:46:27,200  
and making sure they're properly aligned

1452  
00:46:30,150 --> 00:46:28,880  
with each other and that the holes in

1453  
00:46:32,710 --> 00:46:30,160  
each of them line up so that there's a

1454  
00:46:34,470 --> 00:46:32,720  
nice straight hole through

1455  
00:46:36,230 --> 00:46:34,480  
we we learned that that alignment was

1456  
00:46:37,910 --> 00:46:36,240  
pretty key and so we changed our

1457  
00:46:39,910 --> 00:46:37,920  
processes to check it measured make sure

1458  
00:46:41,670 --> 00:46:39,920  
we tweaked it just right and then we had

1459  
00:46:43,829 --> 00:46:41,680  
the the scrub for the leak here on this

1460  
00:46:45,990 --> 00:46:43,839  
one and we learned that the qd that we

1461  
00:46:48,230 --> 00:46:46,000  
plug into that hole has a bellow spring

1462  
00:46:50,710 --> 00:46:48,240  
inside it and a little bullnose

1463  
00:46:52,710 --> 00:46:50,720

and a probe and and that can have an

1464

00:46:54,550 --> 00:46:52,720

alignment within the cutie itself which

1465

00:46:55,349 --> 00:46:54,560

can then cause that concentricity to

1466

00:46:56,710 --> 00:46:55,359

either

1467

00:46:58,309 --> 00:46:56,720

move to one side or the other so what

1468

00:47:00,069 --> 00:46:58,319

might look like a nice sweet spot down

1469

00:47:02,069 --> 00:47:00,079

the middle alignment when you hook this

1470

00:47:03,829 --> 00:47:02,079

qd up it kind of bends it a little bit

1471

00:47:05,270 --> 00:47:03,839

now pushes it down towards the the

1472

00:47:06,950 --> 00:47:05,280

limits where you might open up and gap

1473

00:47:08,710 --> 00:47:06,960

and leak and and that's what happened so

1474

00:47:10,550 --> 00:47:08,720

we learned

1475

00:47:12,390 --> 00:47:10,560

if i want to be i want to be pretty

1476  
00:47:13,829 --> 00:47:12,400  
crude about it we learned the second

1477  
00:47:15,030 --> 00:47:13,839  
piece of the puzzle that we didn't know

1478  
00:47:17,030 --> 00:47:15,040  
about the first time we had the league

1479  
00:47:19,510 --> 00:47:17,040  
so it took two failures to make us see

1480  
00:47:21,349 --> 00:47:19,520  
both halves of the of the puzzle uh and

1481  
00:47:23,510 --> 00:47:21,359  
so now we're we did it we did a whole

1482  
00:47:24,790 --> 00:47:23,520  
extensive review and now we truly do

1483  
00:47:25,670 --> 00:47:24,800  
believe we have the whole complete

1484  
00:47:27,349 --> 00:47:25,680  
picture

1485  
00:47:29,109 --> 00:47:27,359  
and that we can line this up properly

1486  
00:47:30,790 --> 00:47:29,119  
every single time we do now a whole lot

1487  
00:47:33,270 --> 00:47:30,800  
of optics measurements on all the parts

1488  
00:47:34,630 --> 00:47:33,280

ahead of time match them all up to say

1489

00:47:36,069 --> 00:47:34,640

with the alignments we see on the tank

1490

00:47:38,069 --> 00:47:36,079

and the alignments we see in the in the

1491

00:47:39,510 --> 00:47:38,079

disconnect what's the right combination

1492

00:47:41,589 --> 00:47:39,520

of parts to give you the alignment right

1493

00:47:43,349 --> 00:47:41,599

down the middle um and then we did a

1494

00:47:44,950 --> 00:47:43,359

bunch of offline testing to show that

1495

00:47:46,230 --> 00:47:44,960

that all the movement and the twang and

1496

00:47:47,670 --> 00:47:46,240

the vent arm hooking up and pulling

1497

00:47:49,190 --> 00:47:47,680

around won't move that alignment once

1498

00:47:51,109 --> 00:47:49,200

you get if you can get it good and solid

1499

00:47:52,549 --> 00:47:51,119

to begin with it'll stay there

1500

00:47:54,069 --> 00:47:52,559

and so we have very high confidence that

1501

00:47:55,670 --> 00:47:54,079

we have a good seal when we got out to

1502

00:47:57,349 --> 00:47:55,680

the pad we hooked it up we went back and

1503

00:47:59,030 --> 00:47:57,359

did some data reviews and and there were

1504

00:48:01,030 --> 00:47:59,040

some things there that caused us to to

1505

00:48:02,549 --> 00:48:01,040

question it uh we've since done the math

1506

00:48:04,309 --> 00:48:02,559

to show that we didn't move anything and

1507

00:48:05,750 --> 00:48:04,319

that that was a perfectly good aligned

1508

00:48:07,670 --> 00:48:05,760

system but there was a little bit of

1509

00:48:09,670 --> 00:48:07,680

question there and and we knew by going

1510

00:48:11,030 --> 00:48:09,680

back to the new procedures and processes

1511

00:48:12,790 --> 00:48:11,040

we could remove some of that uncertainty

1512

00:48:14,870 --> 00:48:12,800

so we chose to redo it and just

1513

00:48:16,630 --> 00:48:14,880

basically start back at square one again

1514

00:48:19,030 --> 00:48:16,640

and and so i'm highly confident you know

1515

00:48:20,630 --> 00:48:19,040

we were we kind of gave it a 99.9 chance

1516

00:48:22,230 --> 00:48:20,640

heading into the tanking test and that

1517

00:48:23,670 --> 00:48:22,240

was our proof in the pudding we followed

1518

00:48:25,349 --> 00:48:23,680

the exact same process and procedure to

1519

00:48:26,549 --> 00:48:25,359

hook it back up again so i expect the

1520

00:48:28,309 --> 00:48:26,559

exact same result that we'll have a nice

1521

00:48:30,870 --> 00:48:28,319

tight system

1522

00:48:33,190 --> 00:48:30,880

marcia marsha done associated press for

1523

00:48:35,109 --> 00:48:33,200

either bill or mike moses um regarding

1524

00:48:37,109 --> 00:48:35,119

tim copra um

1525

00:48:39,270 --> 00:48:37,119

did you manage to get his own food

1526

00:48:41,349 --> 00:48:39,280

preferences and his own clothes on

1527

00:48:42,950 --> 00:48:41,359

borders i'm sorry

1528

00:48:45,750 --> 00:48:42,960

are they still on board or did you get

1529

00:48:47,990 --> 00:48:45,760

steve bowen's stuff on board and is tim

1530

00:48:49,510 --> 00:48:48,000

cobra coming for the launch do you know

1531

00:48:50,870 --> 00:48:49,520

i don't know if copper is coming for the

1532

00:48:53,030 --> 00:48:50,880

launch

1533

00:48:54,790 --> 00:48:53,040

we did swap out all the preference

1534

00:48:57,349 --> 00:48:54,800

equipment i think on the food question

1535

00:48:58,630 --> 00:48:57,359

if i looked at the exact math i think uh

1536

00:48:59,990 --> 00:48:58,640

steve chose to keep some of the same

1537

00:49:01,750 --> 00:49:00,000

menu item so i'm not sure we changed out

1538

00:49:03,109 --> 00:49:01,760

a whole lot of menu items

1539

00:49:05,270 --> 00:49:03,119

but yeah he certainly had input we had

1540

00:49:07,670 --> 00:49:05,280

plenty of time to take care of that

1541

00:49:12,069 --> 00:49:07,680

yeah and one other thing to this evening

1542

00:49:13,670 --> 00:49:12,079

at 7 23 if you go outside at 66 degrees

1543

00:49:15,270 --> 00:49:13,680

above the southwest you'll get a chance

1544

00:49:16,870 --> 00:49:15,280

to see station fly over the kennedy

1545

00:49:18,630 --> 00:49:16,880

space center tonight so we ought to go

1546

00:49:20,150 --> 00:49:18,640

do that here in a couple minutes

1547

00:49:22,549 --> 00:49:20,160

and then if you happen to be in houston

1548

00:49:25,270 --> 00:49:22,559

on saturday you get a special treat it's

1549

00:49:27,990 --> 00:49:25,280

6 47 you get to see the space station

1550

00:49:29,750 --> 00:49:28,000

fly over and then at 6 52 on saturday

1551

00:49:31,510 --> 00:49:29,760

night you'll get a chance to see atv

1552

00:49:33,750 --> 00:49:31,520

chasing the space station and catching

1553

00:49:35,270 --> 00:49:33,760

up so the folks in houston get a treat i

1554

00:49:37,430 --> 00:49:35,280

checked here in florida and it doesn't

1555

00:49:38,950 --> 00:49:37,440

doesn't happen here but you can you can

1556

00:49:41,589 --> 00:49:38,960

the guys in florida get a chance to go

1557

00:49:43,109 --> 00:49:41,599

see both the atv and the htv so it's

1558

00:49:44,630 --> 00:49:43,119

it's neat for us to actually go see our

1559

00:49:46,309 --> 00:49:44,640

hardware in orbit and actually see it

1560

00:49:47,670 --> 00:49:46,319

flying overhead you know sometimes we

1561

00:49:49,349 --> 00:49:47,680

see all the view graphs in the meetings

1562

00:49:51,030 --> 00:49:49,359

and we're not sure it's real so it's

1563

00:49:52,549 --> 00:49:51,040

it's even nice for us to go outside

1564

00:49:53,670 --> 00:49:52,559

occasionally and make sure that it's

1565

00:49:55,829 --> 00:49:53,680

really there and it's doing what all

1566

00:49:57,270 --> 00:49:55,839

those guys told us in these meetings so

1567

00:49:59,349 --> 00:49:57,280

that's our confirmation to show that

1568

00:50:02,470 --> 00:49:59,359

orbital mechanics really works so so you

1569

00:50:03,990 --> 00:50:02,480

should do that tonight at 7 23.

1570

00:50:04,710 --> 00:50:04,000

all right and with that we will wrap it

1571

00:50:07,349 --> 00:50:04,720

up

1572

00:50:09,109 --> 00:50:07,359

our next televised event for sts-133

1573

00:50:10,630 --> 00:50:09,119

will be the arrival of the flight crew

1574

00:50:13,670 --> 00:50:10,640

on sunday

1575

00:50:15,829 --> 00:50:13,680

at 3 45 pm eastern time here at kennedy

1576

00:50:19,270 --> 00:50:15,839

space center once again our launch is

1577

00:50:21,670 --> 00:50:19,280

set for thursday february 24th at 4 50

1578

00:50:23,829 --> 00:50:21,680

pm eastern time and you can keep up with